Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 6

March 2011

TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel
Peter K. Yu
peter_yu@msn.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Yu: TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel

TRIPS AND ITS ACHILLES' HEEL
PeterK Yu*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
481

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

.............................................
CHALLENGES
......
A. HISTORICAL CHALLENGES: PATH DEPENDENCY .......
B. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: RESOURCE AND CAPACITY
..........
................................
CONSTRAINTS
C. NEGOTIATION CHALLENGES: THE TRIPS NEGOTIATIONS..........
D. DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES: NON-IP, NON-TRADE
........
......................
FACTORS.................
E. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES: NEW INTERNET-RELATED
.................
ISSUES...............................
......
.......................................
F. SUMMvARY

III.

...........................................

....................................
POST-TRIPS RESPONSES
.........................
A. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

................
1. TRIPS Counil............
.............................
2. Dispute Settlement Body
........................................
3. ACTA

483
485

487
492
499
502
504

504
........ 505

.....

505
508
511

Copyright 0 2011 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School; Wenlan Scholar Chair
Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law; Visiting Professor, Centre for
International Intellectual Property Studies, University of Strasbourg. An earlier version of this
Article was presented at the "15 Years of TRIPS Implementation: Intellectual Property Protection
from a Global Perspective" Symposium at the University of Georgia School of Law, the 2010
International Law Weekend in New York, and as a public lecture at the Centre for International
Intellectual Property Studies at the University of Strasbourg. The Author would like to thank
Christophe Geiger for his kind invitation and hospitality and Irene Calboli, Patricia Judd, Janewa
OseiTutu, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, and the participants of these events for their valuable
comments and suggestions. He is also grateful to Paul Heald and the Journalof Intellectual Properly
Law for their kind invitation to help organize this symposium and to Jennifer Pridgeon, Jason
Sheppard, other members of the Journal, Donald Johnson, and the Dean Rusk Center at the
University of Georgia School of Law for making the event possible.

479

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2011

1

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6

J.INTELL

480

B.

PROP.L

[Vol. 18:479

............
.................
...........
1. TRIPS Council.......................
.................................
2. Dirpute Settlement Body
3. TRIPS Counci PartDeux .............................................................

514

..................................................
1: TRIPS AND CONTINUITY ........................................
2: ENFORCEMENT AS A MUTUAL BENEFIT .......................
3: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES........................
4: LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES .......................................

522
522
523
525
527

LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

IV.

LESSONS..
A. LESSON
B. LESSON
C. LESSON
D. LESSON

V.

CONCLUSION

....................................................

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/6

514
515
518

530

2

Yu: TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel
2011]

TRIPS AND ITS ACHILLES' HEEL

481

I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights' (TRIPS Agreement), commentators widely praised
the Agreement for transforming the international intellectual property system.
While some considered the extension of the mandatory dispute settlement
process of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to intellectual property
disputes a crowning achievement of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
(Uruguay Round), 2 others extolled the unprecedented benefits of having a set of
multilateral enforcement norms built into the international intellectual property
system.3 With twenty-one provisions on obligations that range from border
measures to criminal sanctions, the TRIPS Agreement, for the first time,
I Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The FirstTen Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 17, 32 (2005) ("Dispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO."); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS
and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 275, 275 (1997) (noting that the two achievements
of the Uruguay Round are, as the tide suggests, "Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement
Together"); Ruth Okediji, Toward an InternationalFairUse Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75,
149-50 (2000) ("One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is the dispute
resolution mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall design of the new trading system."
(footnote omitted)).
3 See Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appmpriations Act of 1998
8.97,
WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Section 211 Panel Report] ("The inclusion of [Part III]
on enforcement in the TRIPS Agreement was one of the major accomplishments of the Uruguay
Round negotiations as it expanded the scope of enforcement aspect of intellectual property rights.
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, provisions related to enforcement were limited to general
obligations to provide legal remedies and seizure of infringing goods."); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 2008) ("The enforcement
section of the TRIPS Agreement is clearly one of the major achievements of the negotiation.");
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.-INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. [UNCTADICTSD], RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 629 (2005) [hereinafter TRIPS

RESOURCE BOOK] ("The introduction of a detailed set of enforcement rules as part of TRIPS has
been . .. one of the major innovations of this Agreement."); Carlos M. Correa, The Push for
Strnger Enforcement Rules: ImpRcationsfor Developing Countries, in ICTSD, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 34

(2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL DEBATE] ("The TRIPS Agreement is the first international treaty on
IPRs that has included specific norms on the enforcement of IPRs." (footnote omitted)); Adrian
Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. 3. TRANSNAT'L
L. 391, 403 (1996) ("[The enforcement] rules constitute the first time in any area of international
law that such rules on domestic enforcement procedures and remedies have been negotiated.");
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crsscurrntsin the InternationalIntellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 323, 366 (2004) ("Part III of the TRIPS Agreement delineated international standards for
the enforcement of intellectual property rights for the first time, including civil, administrative,
and criminal procedures and remedies and measures related to border control." (footnote
omitted)).
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provides comprehensive international minimum standards on the enforcement
of intellectual property rights.4
Notwithstanding these quick praises, some commentators provided more
measured assessments. For example, in a prescient, and still highly relevant,
article published shortly after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, Jerome
Reichman and David Lange described the Agreement's enforcement provisions
as its "Achilles' heel."5 As they observed:
[TIhe enforcement provisions are crafted as broad legal
standards, rather than as narrow rules, and their inherent
ambiguity will make it harder for mediators or dispute-settlement
panels to pin down clear-cut violations of international
law... . [W e predict that the level of enforcement under the
TRIPS Agreement will greatly disappoint rightsholders in the
developed countries, and that recourse to coercive measures will
not appreciably improve the situation in the short and medium
terms.6
In an earlier piece, Ruth Okediji also noted that the TRIPS Agreement's
marriage of intellectual property to trade can either provide promising prospects
for global enforcement of intellectual property rights or become the Achilles'
heel of the international trading system.7
With more than fifteen years of TRIPS developments, including the release
of the recent WTO panel report on intellectual property enforcement,8 it is time
to reevaluate the TRIPS Agreement's strengths and weaknesses in the
enforcement area. This Article focuses primarily on its weaknesses. It points
out that, although the Agreement fails to induce stronger global enforcement of
intellectual property rights, such failure is neither a surprise nor a
disappointment. Rather, that outcome is expected in view of the many challenges
confronting the development of international intellectual property enforcement
norms. In fact, it would be highly unrealistic to expect all of these challenges to
4 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41-61.
5 J.H. Reichman & David Lange, BargainingAround the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing
Public-Private Initadves to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 11, 34-40 (1998) (explaining why the enforcement provisions are the "Achilles' heel of
the TRIPS Agreement").
6 Id. at 35, 38-39.
7 See Ruth L. Gana [Okediji], Prospectsfor Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 775 (1996) ("[I]t is important to observe that the protection of
intellectual property rights within the auspices of the WTO effectively links the well-being of the
entire system of world trade to the success of the TRIPs Agreement and vice versa. This perhaps
is the greatest source of enforcement prospects for the TRIPs Agreement. History suggests,
however, that this may also be its Achilles heel.").
8 Panel Report, China-MeasuresAfecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual ProperyRights,
\WT/DS362/R (an. 26, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report].
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be successfully tackled by a single multilateral agreement in such a short period
of time.
Part II examines why the TRIPS Agreement fails to provide effective global
enforcement of intellectual property rights. In doing so, it identifies five sets of
challenges: historical, economic, tactical, disciplinary, and technological. Part
III outlines the various actions taken by both developed and less developed
countries9 to steer the TRIPS Agreement and the larger international intellectual
property system toward their preferred positions. While developed countries
push for the development of stronger enforcement norms, less developed
countries resist those demands and complain about the use of bilateral,
plurilateral, and regional trade and investment agreements to establish TRIPSplus standards. Part IV concludes with four lessons that can be drawn from the
continuous battle between developed and less developed countries over
international intellectual property enforcement norms. Given the significance
of effective enforcement to both developed and less developed countries, it is
the hope of this Article that a better understanding of these four lessons will
lead to a more balanced, robust, and sustainable global intellectual property
enforcement regime.
II. CHALLENGES

Although the TRIPS Agreement ushered in new and higher standards on
international intellectual property enforcement, these standards have yet to
strengthen intellectual property enforcement to the satisfaction of the demandeur
countries in the developed world. Thus, many developed countries and their
supportive industries consider these standards primitive, constrained,
inadequate, and ineffective."o These deficiencies were indeed a primary reason

9 The TRIPS Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed countries.
This Article uses "less developed countries" to denote both developing and least developed
countries. When referring specifically to the TRIPS Agreement itself, however, this Article may
return to use of the terms "developing countries" and "least developed countries."
10See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMIM'N, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE, STRATEGY FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES 3 (2005), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_1 22636.pdf ("Violations of intellectual
property rights ... continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial proportions.
This happens despite the fact that, by now, most of the VTO members have adopted legislation
implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement."); TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E.
ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 4 (2008) (noting that

"it has become apparent to some national governments, and regional organizations that the
'aggressive' enforcement provisions of TRIPS, particularly the border measures, have fallen short
of expectations of providing an effective system of thwarting international movement of
infringing goods"); Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Properly Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufcient
Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2008-2009)
(discussing the inadequacies of the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and
explaining the need for TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the area of
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for the developed countries' aggressive push for the establishment of new and
higher international benchmarks through the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA)" and other bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade and
investment agreements.12
The TRIPS Agreement's lack of success in the enforcement area is, indeed,
interesting. After all, developed countries, by most accounts, have imposed
their higher intellectual property protection standards on their less developed
trading partners.13 As Jacques Gorlin observed in retrospect, the Intellectual
Property Committee-an ad hoc coalition of major U.S. corporations he
directed in an effort to push for the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement 4 got ninety-five percent of what it wanted and was particularly pleased with the
enforcement provisions. 5

border enforcement).
I' Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, openedfor signature May 1, 2011, available
at http://trad e.ec.europa.eu/docib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
See generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (andNow Open) Fears ofACIA, 64 SMU L. REv. (forthcoming
2011) (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA).
12 See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath &

Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays discussing free trade agreements in the
intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Exporting Controversy?
Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade
Polig, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement);
Jean-Frederic Morin, Muhlilateraligng TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009) (examining the United States' free trade agreement strategy);
Pedro Roffe et al., Intellectual Ppery Rights in Free Trade Agreements: Moving Beyond TRIPS Minimum
Standards,in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER

WTO RULES 266 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing free trade agreements in relation to the
TRIPS framework); Yu, supra note 3, at 392-400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral,
plurilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual property standards); Peter
K. Yu, Sinic TradeAgreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953 (2011) (critically examining the strengths
and weaknesses of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements).
13 See generally GERVAIS, supra note 3, at 3-27 (describing the origins and development of the
TRIPS Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS
Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79
(2006) (examining four different accounts of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
14 Formed in March 1986, the Intellectual Property Committee brought together top corporate
executives from about a dozen U.S.-based multinational firms. In addition to coordinating
industry positions on intellectual property policies with the U.S. government, the Committee was
instrumental in "forging an industry consensus with its Japanese [Keidanren] and European
industry counterparts [UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe)],
who agreed to work on [a trade-based approach to protecting intellectual property] and pledged
to present these views to their respective governments in time for the launching of the Uruguay
Round." SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 106 (2003). See general# id. at 96-120 (discussing the role of the Intellectual
Property Committee in pushing for the adoption of high intellectual property standards in the
TRIPS Agreement).
'5 Id. at 115 (citing interview with Jacques Gorlin).
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To help us better understand why the TRIPS Agreement fails to provide
effective global enforcement of intellectual property rights, this Part identifies
five challenges: historical, economic, tactical, disciplinary, and technological. It
explains why the development of international intellectual property
enforcement norms remains a work in progress to which the TRIPS Agreement
has made only modest contributions.
A. HISTORICAL CHALLENGES: PATH DEPENDENCY

The TRIPS Agreement's failure to develop strong international intellectual
property enforcement norms can largely be seen as a problem of historical
legacy. The problem owes its origin to, first, a lack of development of
enforcement norms in the international intellectual property system in the past
two centuries and, more recently, the developed countries' constraints and
misguided tactics in the TRIPS negotiation process. This section discusses the
lack of historical developments, while Part II.C will discuss the negotiation
challenges. Taken together, these two sections show that the development of
the international intellectual property system is highly path-dependent.16
Although commentators widely use international harmonization as the
justification for the development of the international intellectual property
system, this system focuses more on the development of international
minimum standards than on the creation of a uniform universal code." In the
16 As Professor Okediji observed:
Assimilating [developing and least developed countries] into the global copyright
system is a familiar component of the path dependency characteristic of global
copyright lawmaking. Since the Stockholm Protocol, which first formally
acknowledged special needs of [developing countries], no other revision of the
Berne Convention or associated special treaty has purposively sought to identify
the impact of new provisions on the development needs and aspirations of the
global South beyond general statements regarding the "balance" evidenced by
the formal language of the treaties. Instead, the justifications for "globalizing
copyright" have sought to impute benefits deeply linked to and dependent on
the existence of capital markets and institutional actors to copyright regulation
in the impoverished and unstable economies of much of the Southern
Hemisphere.
Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creadsity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2379, 2405 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
17 See Panel Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection 1 6.87, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000)
("Article 1.1 confirms that the TRIPS Agreement is a minimum standards agreement in respect of
intellectual property rights."); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System:
Treaes, Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE EcoNoMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 61,

66-67 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT] (noting that "national treatment plus substantive minima. .. remains the
dominant approach in current intellectual property treaties"); Yu, supra note 3, at 339 (noting that
"in lieu of reciprocity, the [original Berne] Convention adopted the principle of national
treatment, which requires member states to grant to foreigners the same rights they grant to their
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enforcement area, the development of such minimum standards was particularly
limited, and countries continue to have wide and deep disagreements over how
intellectual property rights are to be enforced. 8
Although the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 9
(Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works 20 (Berne Convention)-two key international intellectual
property conventions-include many substantive provisions, they contain very
few provisions concerning intellectual property enforcement. 21 For example,
Article 9 of the Paris Convention provides detailed provisions on the seizure on
importation of goods bearing an infringing trademark or trade name. 22 Article
10(1) applies those seizure provisions to the "direct or indirect use of a false
indication of the source of the goods or the identity of the producer,
manufacturer, or merchant." 23 Article 10bis requires members to provide
"effective protection against unfair competition." 24 Article 10ter further
requires members to provide "appropriate legal remedies effectively to repress
all the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10, and 10bis."25 Similarly, in the Berne
Convention, Article 13(3) allows for the seizure on importation of infringing
copies of protected sound recordings. 26 Article 15 stipulates who is entitled to
institute infringement proceedings to enforce protected rights under the
Convention. 27 Article 16 governs the seizure of infringing copies of a protected
work.28
In short, intellectual property enforcement provisions in the Paris and Berne
Conventions were rare and piecemeal. Not until the adoption of the TRIPS

own nationals"); id. at 349 (noting that the drafters of the original Paris Convention settled on
only "minimal unification," as compared to full harmonization); Peter K. Yu, The International
Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 863-66 (2007) (discussing the flexibilities in the TRIPS
Agreement).
18See TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 575 (noting the existence of "wide
differences . .. in national laws with regard to enforcement rules"); Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa,
Towards a Development Approach on IP Enforcement: Conclusions and Strateic Recommendations, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEs 207, 207 (Li Xuan &
Carlos M. Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (noting "the
great varation in enforcement measures in national law").
19 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
20 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
21 See TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 629-30 (noting the few intellectual property
enforcement provisions in the international intelectual property system).
22 Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 9.
23 Id. art. 10(1).
24 Id. art. 10bis(1).
25 Id. art. 10ter(1).
26 Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 13(3).
27 Id art. 15.
28 Id. art. 16.
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Agreement did the international intellectual property system include
comprehensive multilateral norms on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights. In light of their recent origin, international intellectual property
enforcement norms have been largely underdeveloped, and their effectiveness
and clarity do not compare well with the substantive provisions of the Paris and
Berne Conventions, many of which have existed for more than a century.
B. ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: RESOURCE AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

While the lack of historical development of enforcement norms in the
international intellectual property system explains why such norms are
underdeveloped, it does not explain why the delegates from the demandeur
countries did not push harder to strengthen those norms through the TRIPS
negotiations. Instead, the delegates' reluctance needs to be attributed to other
reasons. For example, high enforcement standards often come with a hefty
price tag, difficult tradeoffs, and serious intrusions upon a country's
sovereignty. 29 The introduction of these standards, therefore, is highly
controversial.
In addition, the TRIPS delegates might have more negotiation items on
hand than they could handle satisfactorily within the confines of the negotiation
process. Some delegates might also have assumed wrongly that countries could
translate treaty language easily into effective enforcement after the TRIPS
Agreement entered into effect. 30 This section focuses on the hefty price tag and
difficult tradeoffs, and the next section will explore the negotiation challenges
confronting the demandeur countries.
Strong intellectual property enforcement requires a substantial investment of
resources, the development of supporting institutional infrastructures, and the
introduction of complementary policy reforms. Although the challenge of
obtaining resources to strengthen intellectual property enforcement exists in
both developed and less developed countries, 3' this challenge is particularly
29 As China noted in its first written submission to the DSB:
International organizations accord great deference to national authorities in
criminal law matters. A review of international law shows that states have
traditionally regarded criminal law as the exclusive domain of sovereign
jurisdiction; where sovereign governments are subject to international
commitments concerning criminal law, these commitments afford significant
discretion to governments regarding implementation; and international courts
have been exceedingly reluctant to impose specific criminal standards on states.
7.501
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8, Annex B-1, 112; see also id.
(acknowledging the "sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding
sovereignty").
30 See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910) (noting
the distinction between law in books and law in action).
31 While discussions of capacity and resource constraints often focus on less developed
countries, these constraints affect developed countries as well. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights
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acute in less developed countries. Even worse, many of the world's least
developed countries continue to struggle just to meet basic needs, such as the
provision of clean drinking water, food, shelter, electricity, schools, and basic
health care. It is therefore understandable why enforcement is a highly sensitive
issue in international intellectual property negotiations.
From an economic standpoint, the strengthening of intellectual property
enforcement standards incurs a wide variety of costs. Of primary concern to
less developed countries are the administrative costs of a strong intellectual
property enforcement regime: the costs incurred in building new institutional
infrastructures; restructuring existing agencies; developing specialized expertise
through training or other means; and staffing courts, police forces, customs
offices, and prisons. 32 While, in the past, private rights holders funded
enforcement costs through civil litigation, the growing demands for
criminalization and public enforcement have led to a gradual shift of
33
responsibility from private rights holders to national governments.

Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: HearingBefore the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm'n, 109th
Cong. 9 (2006) (written testimony of Chris Israel, Int'l IPR Enforcement Coordinator, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce) ("With finite resources and seemingly infinite concerns, how [the United States]
focus[es its] efforts is crucial."); IntellectualProperty Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: Hearing
Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm'n, 109th Cong. 183 (2006) (oral testimony of Peter
Pitts, President, Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, New York) ("When I was at the
[Food and Drug Administration], people asked me why don't you stop people at the border and
arrest them coming in from Canada? The answer is that's not the best bang for the regulatory
dollar. What government needs to do is go after the big time criminals."); TIM PHILLIPS,
KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 36 (2005) (acknowledging the
impossibility for the New York Police Department "to raid all the warehouses all of the time
without swallowing the entire NYPD anti-counterfeiting budget and taking officers off other
duties"); Trainer, supra note 10, at 58 (lamenting how "the staff dedicated solely to IPR
enforcement [in the U.S. government] could be counted on two hands").
32 See TRAINER & ALLUMS, supra note 10, at 705-06 (noting that "the upgrading of the border
enforcement system to a more aggressive and proactive system will entail significant change in
agency structure and legal authority"); Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Propery Rights: An
Economic Perspective, in GLOBAL DEBATE, supra note 3, at xiii, 15 ("[E]nforcement actions take real
resources. Courts, police forces, customs offices, and other competent authorities need to be
adequately staffed and equipped to respond to complaints by right holders and to act on their
own. In addition, governments face the costs of maintaining prisons and, possibly, destroying
seized pirated and counterfeit products that cannot be auctioned off as generic goods.").
33 As Carlos Correa noted:
Criminalization is regarded by its proponents as a stronger deterrent than civil
remedies. For right holders there are some significant advantages: actions can
or must be initiated ex offido and the cost of procedures is fully borne by the
states. However, it is clear that IPRs are private rights and that states' only
obligation under the TRIPS Agreement is to ensure that enforcement
procedures are available, and not to enforce IPRs themselves on its own cost
and responsibility.
Correa, supra note 3, at 27, 42; see also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 18, at 28
("[R]esponsibility of enforcement has cost implications.... [B]y shifting responsibility, it would
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More problematically, such a shift has brought with it significant risks that
may ultimately backfire on a country's goal to use intellectual property
protection to attract foreign investment. For instance, strengthening border
control requires the development of specialized expertise and sophistication on
the part of customs authorities. If these authorities fail to develop the requisite
expertise and sophistication, their inconsistent-and at times wrongfulapplication of new, and usually tougher, border measures may lead to
34
uncertainty and other concerns that eventually frighten away foreign investors.
Even worse, irregularities in the application of these measures may become the
subject of complaints that firms file with their governments. These complaints,
in turn, may lead to greater pressure from foreign governments-for example,
through the United States' notorious Section 301 process. 35 In the end, what
started as a country's means of attracting foreign investment and promoting
economic development ends up being a heavy burden on an already resourcedeficient country.
Of bigger concern among human rights groups, civil libertarians, consumer
advocates, and academic commentators are the high opportunity costs incurred
by strengthened intellectual property enforcement. Given the limited resources
in many less developed countries, an increase in the commitment of resources
in the enforcement area inevitably will lead to the withdrawal of resources from
other competing, and at times more important, public needs. These public
needs include purification of water; generation of power; improvement of
public health; reduction of child mortality; provision of education; promotion
of public security; building of basic infrastructure; reduction of violent crimes;
relief of poverty; elimination of hunger; promotion of gender equality;

shift the cost of enforcement from private parties to the government and ensure right-holders are
beneficiaries without asking responsibility."); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Re-Delineationofthe Role
of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond Exclusive Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 18, at 43, 51-52 (noting the trend of "externalizing the risks and resources to enforce
IP rights away from the originally responsible rights-holders towards state authorities"); Susan K.
Sell, The GlobalIP Upward Ratchet,Anti-Counterfeiing and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 9
(IQsensato, Occasional Papers No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/
uploads/Sel 1IIPEnforcementState_ofPlay-OPs_1_june_2008.pdf ("The opportunity costs of
switching scarce resources for border enforcement of IP 'crimes' is huge. There surely are more
pressing problems for law enforcement in developing countries than ensuring profits for OECDbased firms.").
34 See Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 18, at 52 (stating that, because ex offido actions do not
require rights holders to post bond or other forms of security that could be used to defray any
potential damages, these actions "not only shift the initiative and costs for taking action to the
state but also entail significant risks of damaging claims by affected importers whenever the goods
suspended in the end are not IP infringing").
35 See Yu, supra note 11 (noting the interplay between the USTR's Section 301 process and
heightened border measures as required by ACTA and other TRIPS-plus bilateral, plurilateral, or
regional trade agreements).
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protection of the environment; and responses to terrorism, illegal arms sales,
human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and corruption. 36
The competition between intellectual property enforcement and these public
needs is rather ill-timed given the acute shortage of resources created by the
recent global economic crisis. Such competition is also disturbing considering
the fact that "global investment in areas of poverty, hunger, health and
education is [still] less than half of what is needed to reach the Millennium
Development Goals."37
The strengthening of intellectual property
enforcement, therefore, not only has had an adverse impact on some individual
countries, but it has also undermined the ability of the global community to
achieve development goals.

36 See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott & Carlos M. Correa, World Trade Organization Accession
Agreements: Intellectual Property Issues 31 (Quaker United Nations Office, Global Economic Issues
Paper No. 6, 2007), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/WTO-IP-E
nglish.pdf ("For many developing countries, protection of IPRs is not, nor should it be, a national
priority. Financial resources are better invested in public infrastructure projects, such as water
purification and power generation."); Correa, supra note 3, at 43 ("[I]n developing countries that
suffer from high levels of street crime and other forms of criminality that put at risk the life,
integrity, or freedom of persons on a daily basis, it seems reasonable that fighting such crimes
should receive higher priority than IP-related crimes where protected interests are essentially of a
commercial nature (except when associated with adulteration of health and other risky
products)." (footnote omitted)); Fink, supra note 32, at 2 ("Governments need to make choices
about how many resources to spend on combating piracy, as opposed to enforcing other areas of
law, building roads and bridges, protecting national security, and providing other public goods.
Such choices are usually not stated in explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by
federal and local governments."); IP Justice, ACTA's Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and
Ratchet-Up IPR Enforcement at PublicExpense, IP JUsTICE, http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/03/21 /act
a-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/ (Mar. 21, 2008) ("The financial expense to tax-payers to fund
ACTA would be enormous and steal scarce resources away from programs that deal with genuine
public needs like providing education and eliminating hunger. ACTA would burden the judicial
system and divert badly needed law enforcement and customs resources away from public
security and towards private profit."); Li & Correa, supra note 18, at 210 (noting that the demands
for strengthened intellectual property enforcement "seem to overlook the cost of the required
actions, the different priorities that exist in developing countries regarding the use of public funds
(health and education would normally be regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the
crucial fact that IPRs are private rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to
be borne by the right-holder, not the public at large"); Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana
Mufioz Tellez, The Changing Structure and Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 4 (South
Centre, Research Paper No. 15, 2008), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?optio
n=comdocman&task=docdownload&gid=714&Itemid=&lang=en ("Police raids and the use
of criminal law enforcement mechanisms . . . require extensive use of public funds and in
developing countries may entail pulling resources away from other law enforcement efforts when
there are other means, particularly via civil law, that may be strengthened to allow private parties
to enforce their rights and which do not require extensive use of public funds."); Xue Hong,
Enforcementfor Development: Why Not an Agenda for the Developing World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 18, at 133, 143 ("Increment and strength of public enforcement
measures will inevitably impose an economic burden on the developing countries and divert the
priorities of these countries, such as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty.").
3 Li, supra note 33, at 29.
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In addition to administrative and opportunity costs, economists and
commentators have identified many other costs, such as adjustment costs due
to labor displacement, social costs associated with monopoly pricing, higher
imitation and innovation costs, potential costs resulting from the abuse of
intellectual property rights, and costs of litigation and litigation error.38
Although these costs are alarming, how high these and other costs will be
depends ultimately on whether the intellectual property system is appropriately
designed. The more the system is tailored to the needs, interests, conditions,
and priorities of an individual country, the lower the costs will be.
In sum, the high costs incurred by the strengthening of international
intellectual property enforcement standards have raised many sensitive issues.
There are also additional issues concerning whether these costs would increase
needlessly with the adoption of inappropriate global intellectual property
standards-for example, those based on the super-size-fits-all template
enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement. Unless developed countries are willing to
provide considerable and substantive financial and technical assistance 39-other
than the routine support of capacity-building programs 40-these constraints are
unlikely to disappear. It is, therefore, no surprise that some commentators have
suggested that the significant national divergences in enforcement costs,
available resources, and public policy priorities might warrant special and
differential treatment for at least some less developed countries. 41
38 See id. (listing litigation costs and costs of litigation error among the direct costs of TRIPS
enforcement); Keith E. Maskus et al., IntellectualProperty Rights and Economic Development in China, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH

295, 302-06 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) (noting that stronger intellectual
property protection would incur significant costs, such as administrative and enforcement costs,
adjustment costs due to labor displacement, social costs associated with monopoly pricing, higher
imitation and innovation costs and potential costs resulting from the abuse of intellectual
property rights).
39 See discussion infra Part IV.c; see also Trainer, supra note 10, at 74 ("If ACTA is to be
meaningful and welcoming to developing countries (or developed countries that are having
implementation problems) that voluntarily agree to new and higher standards, there must be an
assistance program that is better developed than what has been available in the past.').
40 See, e.g., COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS 149-52 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CI
PRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] (discussing technical assistance and
capacity-building programs); CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 180-86 (2009)
(discussing the use of technical assistance and capacity-building programs to advance agendas in
TRIPS-related policy debates); CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION:

RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

61-66

(2007) (discussing

WIPO's technical assistance and capacity-building efforts).
41 See Fink, supra note 32, at 16 ("Given other demands on public expenditure and diminishing
returns to enforcement actions, society 'tolerates' to some extent violations of laws .... In
addition, 'tolerable' levels of IPRs-infringements may well differ from country to country,
depending, inter alia, on societies' preferences for different public goods." (citation omitted));
Claudio R. Frischtak, HarmoniZation Versus Defferentiation in Intellectual Property Right Regimes, in

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2011

13

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6
492

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 18:479

C. NEGOTIATION CHALLENGES: THE TRIPS NEGOTIATIONS

Added to the difficult and highly sensitive resource and capacity questions
were the demandeurcountries' goals for the TRIPS Agreement. As stated in the
Punta del Este Declaration, which set out the negotiating objectives of the
TRIPS Agreement in a section subtitled "Trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods":
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights,
and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] provisions and
elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of
principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken in
the GATT. 42
Because the TRIPS negotiating mandate included the dual goals of
"promot[ing] effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights,
and . .. ensur[ing] that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade," 43 TRIPS
delegates inevitably had to focus on those negotiation items they believed would
lead to the most satisfactory outcome. Thus, even though intellectual property
enforcement provisions represent slightly more than a quarter of the seventythree provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, more than two-thirds of the
provisions sought to introduce, in a single undertaking, new substantive
minimum standards on which there was no prior international consensus.
For example, Article 10.1 states that "computer programs, whether in source
or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne
Convention."44 Article 23 offers special protection to geographical indications
for wines and spirits. 45 Article 27.1 stipulates that "patents shall be available
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

89,

98 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) ("Mt can be argued that cross-country differences in
protection levels are justified in view of differences in enforcement costs and available
resources.').
42 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20,
1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (1986) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
43 Id
44 TRIPS Agreement art. 10.1.
45 Id. art. 23.
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and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention,
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced." 46 Article 27.3(b) requires members to "provide for the protection
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective suigeneris system or by any
combination thereof." 47 Article 31 delineates the conditions under which
members can issue a compulsory license. 48 Article 35 offers protection to
integrated circuit topographies through a reference to the Washington Treaty
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, which has never
entered into force. 49 Article 39.3 mandates protection against the unfair
commercial use of clinical trial data that have been submitted to regulatory
agencies for the approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products
that utilize new chemical entities.50
Moreover, even though developed countries successfully obtained their
preferred terms in the TRIPS enforcement provisions,5' their success might
have been curtailed by the skillful yet subtle attempt by negotiators from less
developed countries to inject ambiguities, flexibilities, limitations, and
exceptions into the TRIPS Agreement. 52 Although commentators have
recounted the limited knowledge of intellectual property rights in less developed
46 Id. art. 27.1.

47 Id art. 27.3(b); see also WATAL, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that plant variety protection was
"geographically limited").
48 TRIPS Agreement art. 31.
49 Id. art. 35; see also WATAL, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that the protection of integrated circuit
designs "had no effective international treaty").
50 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3; see also WATAL, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that undisclosed
information "has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement before").
51 As Carlos Correa noted:
Unlike other sections of TRIPS, and notwithstanding their importance and far
reaching implications, the enforcement and maintenance provisions were
subject to much less discussion and controversy than the substantive rules
contained in the Agreement. This was reflected in the fact that most provisions
on the enforcement, acquisition and maintenance of IPRs in the final version of
TRIPS are essentially identical to those in the Brussels Draft.
TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 578 (footnote omitted); see also SELL, supra note 14, at
115 ("The [Intellectual Property Committee] was particularly pleased with the enforcement
provisions. The industry representatives' demands are reflected clearly in the final agreement.").
52

See

CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION KNOWLEDGE AGREEMENTS

95 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that "the language that finds its way into the WTO Agreements is likely
to be vague and pliable"); DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 66 (2002) ("Mt should be stated at the outset that it is widely perceived
that while the TRIPs Agreement is an extremely good document in terms of defining
international norms for intellectual property protection, its provisions relating to enforcement
clearly display the characteristics of a difficult compromise reached during the Uruguay Round
negotiations."); WATAL, supra note 13, at 7 (noting the "ambiguities" that have been built into the
TRIPS Agreement to provide less developed countries with a bulwark against the continuous
expansion of intellectual property rights and to "'claw[]' back much of what was lost in the
negotiating battles in TRIPS"); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Princalesof the TRIPS Agreement, 46
Hous. L. REv. 979, 1022-23 (2009) (discussing ambiguous language in the TRIPS Agreement).
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countries at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, such knowledge was clearly
possessed by some delegates, especially those from the powerful developing
countries.53 Only a decade or two before, representatives from these countries
were actively-though unsuccessfully-negotiating the Stockholm Protocol for
Developing Countries54 and the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology.55 The latter actually provided the language for the draft treaty
text advanced by less developed countries, the so-called "B text."56

53 As Peter Drahos observed:
Developing countries do not lack an understanding of intellectual property. In
the 1950s and 1960s India and Brazil developed critiques of Western patent
regimes and African states pushed for the recognition of folklore as a proper
subject matter of copyright protection. It is precisely because developing
countries have shown they have the capacity to develop models that threaten
the hegemony of current Anglo-American-German intellectual property models
that their efforts have been crushed.
Peter Drahos, Introduction in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS

AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 7-8 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS]; see also DEERE, supra note 40, at 8 ("Hamstrung by limited

negotiating capacity and inadequate knowledge of the technical issues under negotiation, no more
than twenty developing countries had the resources and expertise to follow the IP negotiations
and their implications closely." (footnote omitted)); Yu, supra note 13, at 375 ("[It is factually
incorrect to assume that less developed countries did not understand any importance of
intellectual property protection."). But see Lars Anell, Forewordto GERVAIS, supra note 3, at ix, ix
("Most of the participants in the 'Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods' were experienced and skilled trade
negotiators well versed in the details of GATT provisions. However, intellectual property
legislation was new to most of the Members, including the Chairman. Some of the delegations
also had limited resources in their capitals.").
It is worth noting, however, that political dynamics in the capital and the heightened
international pressure these countries received might have severely curtailed the ability of their
delegates to achieve their preferred negotiating positions, especially toward the end of the
negotiations. As with all international matters, the relationships between capitals and diplomatic
outposts (usually Brussels, Geneva, New York, or Washington) are often complicated. The
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement was no exception. See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 40, at 214
(noting the "[w]eak coordination and communication between delegates stationed in Geneva
(with whom the greatest political technical expertise about TRIPS often resided) and their
counterparts in capitals"); Anell, supra, at ix (recounting that "intellectual property legislation was
new to most of the resources in their capitals" during the TRIPS negotiations); Peter K. Yu,
Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 365 (2008)
(suggesting that internal economic problems led to the collapse of India's position toward the end
of the TRIPS negotiations).
54 See generall Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 465, 47184 (2009) (discussing the drafting of the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries).
55 For discussions of the negotiation of the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology under the auspices of UNCTAD, see generally id. at 493-505; INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED
NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds., 2001).

NATIONS

56 See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and GeneralProvisions,in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 10 n.18 (Carlos M. Correa

& Abdulqawi

A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed.
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As a result of the negotiation tactics deployed by Brazil, India, and other
developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement now contains many result-oriented
terms that are vague, broad, and undefined. Examples of these terms are
"'effective', 'reasonable', 'undue', 'unwarranted', 'fair and equitable', and
'not ... unnecessarily complicated or costly.' "57 For example, Article 61, which
sets forth the first-ever multilateral norm on criminal sanctions, does not define
the term "commercial scale" at all.58 The lack of such definition eventually
posed a fatal challenge to the United States' complaint against China over its
failure to extend criminal sanctions to "wilful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale." 59 The undefined term also opened the
door for the WTO panel to interpret the TRIPS language by focusing on local
market conditions, noting that commercial activities may "vary by product and
market."60
Equally important is the inclusion in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement of
provisions that contain only empowerment norms, as compared to norms that
mandate specific actions. 6' For instance, Article 59-the provision at issue in
the U.S.-China dispute-states that "competent authorities shall have the
authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods" seized at the
border. 62 Because this provision requires only the provision of authority, as
compared to the exercise of such authority in a specified way, 63 the United
States could not argue that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to
destroy infringing goods seized at the border-the action preferred by the
United States administration and its supportive rights holders. Instead, the
United States had to advance a much weaker, and rather academic, claim that
China introduced a "compulsory scheme" that took away the authorities'
"scope of authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing goods." 64
INTERNATIONAL TRADE] (recounting that some of the provisions in the B text advanced by less
developed countries "were either directly based on or inspired by those of the Draft International
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology which was negotiated under the auspices of
UNCTAD but was never adopted as an international instrument" (citation omitted)).
57 TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 576; see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WITO Agreement, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 56, at 23, 71 ("[The TRIPS]

enforcement provisions-unlike the substantive standards set out in the agreement-are truly
minimum standards, as attested by the loose and open-ended language in which they are cast.").
5 TRIPS Agreement art. 61.
59 Id.
60 TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8,
7.604; see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS
Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the
need for WTO panels to consider local conditions).
61 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 43-48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 59.
62 Id. art. 59.
63 See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8, 1 7.238 (noting that a WTO member is
not required to "exercise [the stipulated] authority in a particular way, unless otherwise
specified'".
- Id. 17.197.
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If the weakening of TRIPS language was not enough, less developed
countries successfully demanded the inclusion of limitations and exceptions in
the TRIPS Agreement. The most notable exception in the enforcement area is
Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states explicitly that a WTO
member is not required to devote more resources to intellectual property
enforcement than to other areas of law enforcement.65 Led by India, less
developed countries specifically demanded this provision to alleviate concerns
about the lack of resources needed to set up specialized intellectual property
courts or to strengthen intellectual property enforcement. 66 Even today, less
developed countries continue to insist that Article 41.5, along with Article 1.1,
represents the key concessions they won through the TRIPS negotiation
process. 67
In addition, the TRIPS negotiators from the demandeur countries seemed to
have made a conscious choice to delay the negotiation of some of the highly
challenging enforcement issues. Such delay could be attributed to concerns
over the controversial nature of enforcement standards, which, as discussed,
come with a hefty price tag, difficult tradeoffs, and serious intrusion on a
country's sovereignty. The delay could also be due to the delegates' negotiation
priorities and tactics. At the time of the negotiations, countries remained in
disagreement over the scope and extent of many substantive standards. This
disagreement continues today, with many countries complaining about the
standards' unfair and biased nature. 68

65 See TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5 ("Nothing in [Part III of the Agreement] creates any
obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual
property rights and the enforcement of law in general.").
66 See CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 417 (2007); TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at

585 (2005).
67 For example, China made this claim in the recent TRIPS enforcement dispute. See TRIPS
Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8, Annex B-4, $ 33 ("Articles 1.1 and 41.5 were key
concessions to the developing world, which the United States and other developed third parties
seek now to dismiss and disregard.").
68 As Pakistan declared:
Inadequate protection of the assets in which developing countries have
comparative advantage undermines confidence in the IP system. The continued
misappropriation and lack of progress towards an international legal framework
on the protection of the genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore
has especially led to the perception that the current IP system is neitherfair nor
effective in protecting the interests of the developing countries.
Creating an Enabling Environment to Build Respectfor IP: Concept Paperby Pakistan 3(iv), in Advisory
Comm. on Enforcement [ACE], World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Conclusions by the Chair,
annex 1, WIPO/ACE/5/1 1, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enfor
[hereinafter Pakistan's Concept Paper]
cement/en/wipoace_5/wipo-ace_5_11-annexl.pdf
(emphasis added); Yu, supra note 52, at 1024 ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement is now in a deepening
crisis. Its legitimacy has been called into question by the high standards of protection and
enforcement that ignore the needs, interests, and goals of the less-developed member states.").
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Finally, the delegates might have had a misguided optimism about a
country's ability to translate treaty language into effective enforcement. As
Jacque Gorlin recounted candidly: "We had assumed that most countries would
accept the TRIPS obligations, and dispute settlement would fix a few. . .
problems. What has happened, however, is that we are starting to see dispute
settlement cases that cover the wholesale failure to implement TRIPS." 69 In
fact, according to Sylvia Ostry, the evolution of the WTO and its many
agreements surprised the developed countries' negotiators just as much as their
counterparts from less developed countries:
The notion that only the southern countries did not understand
what was going on was quite false. Those of us that had been
involved throughout could not anticipate how complex the new
system would be and what effects on North-South relations
would result from the Bum Deal [created by the Uruguay
Round].70

Regardless of the reasons, the delegates' delay in negotiating these difficult
enforcement issues has curtailed greatly the development of international
intellectual property enforcement norms. To be certain, the delegates' focus on
the comparatively easier task of negotiating substantive standards is defensible.
Such negotiation, after all, was instrumental in breaking the deadlock between
developed and less developed countries, thereby resulting in the successful
conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.7 ' If the TRIPS delegates were given the
same negotiation choices again, they still might have come to the same
conclusion that having a new multilateral agreement without robust
enforcement standards is more important than having no agreement at all.
Nevertheless, by leaving the more difficult enforcement issues for later
discussions, these delegates merely postponed the inevitable challenges. As
Professor Okediji aptly observed, in game theory terms, the negotiation and
enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement can be seen as a two-stage game. 72
69 Symposium, U.S. Industries, Trade Associations, and Intellectual Propery Lawimaking, 10 CARDozo
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 10 (2002) (remarks of Jacques J. Gorlin, Director, Intellectual Property
Committee).
70 Sylvia Ostry, Aymmety in the Uruguay Round and in the Doha Round, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 105 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009)
[hereinafter DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO].
71 See SUsAN

K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH

POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 123-30 (1998) (discussing the famous stalemate between developed
and less developed countries over the Nairobi text of the Paris Convention).
72 See Ruth L. Okediji, Publc Wefare and the Role of the W/TO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 823 (2003). Unlike Professor Okediji, this Author considers the game
played by the WTO member states as a three-stage game, with stages in negotiation,
implementation, and enforcement. Accord MATTHEWS, supra note 52, at 117 (also noting
implementation and enforcement as two different levels). Nevertheless, the difference over the
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Although policymakers in less developed countries, economists, and
commentators continue to question the fairness and expediency of the TRIPS
Agreement, there is no doubt that developed countries won the first-stage
negotiation game decisively. The strategies used to complete this first-stage
game,73 however, left developed countries with a much harder enforcement
game to play-both among themselves and vis-a-vis less developed countries.
As Professor Okediji reasoned:
Having accomplished the primary goal of binding developing
countries to high standards of intellectual property protection,
developed countries must now deal with the costs of "winning"
the first stage game. These include constraints on sovereign
discretion in the area of policy development, and battles over
extant policy differences between the member states. 74
Even worse for the demandeur countries, less developed countries have
acquired more sophisticated knowledge about innovation and intellectual
property since the completion of the TRIPS Agreement. They also have
received more support from intergovernmental and nongovernmental players in
both the North and the South.75 In addition, some leading developing
countries, like China and India, have become significantly more economically
76
developed and technologically proficient than they were two decades ago. If
developed countries had a difficult time obtaining their preferred enforcement

number of stages will not affect the implications of Professor Okediji's important insight into the
multi-stage game the WTO members have to play when they move from negotiation to
enforcement.
73There are many explanations why less developed countries agreed to join the TRIPS
Agreement. See generally Yu, supra note 3, at 325-26 (discussing the various reasons why less
developed countries joined the TRIPS Agreement); Yu, supra note 13, at 371-79 (outlining the
four different narratives commonly used to account for the establishment of the TRIPS
Agreement).
74 Okediji, supra note 72, at 823.
7s See Yu, supra note 53, at 376-78 (discussing the need for less developed countries to work
with nongovernmental organizations, academics, and the media in both the North and the South);
see also SELL, supra note 14, at 181 ("When I asked some public-regarding copyright activists
'where they had been' during TRIPS, they told me they had been 'sleeping' but that because of
TRIPS they had 'woken up.' "); Keith E. Maskus, The WIPO Development Agenda: A Cautionary
Note, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 163, 164 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009) ("Policymakers, non-governmental
organizations, the media, and even many legal scholars have awakened to the fact that IP
regulations have rather fundamental implications for the processes of economic development.").
76 For recent discussions on the rise of China and India, see generally CHINDIA: How CHINA
AND INDIA ARE REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS (Pete Engardio ed., 2006); DANCING WITH
GIANTS: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL EcONOMY (L. Alan Winters & Shahid Yusuf eds.,
2007); ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF Us (2007).
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terms during the TRIPS negotiations, they are likely to have even greater
difficulty today.
In sum, even though developed countries dominated the TRIPS negotiation
process, their tactical constraints and misguided beliefs might have significantly
curtailed their ability to use the TRIPS Agreement to shape international
intellectual property enforcement norms. As Professors Reichman and Lange
rightly observed, the Agreement's enforcement provisions "on closer inspection
appear to constitute a set of truly minimum standards of due process on which
future legislation will have to build." 77 While the adoption of Articles 41 to 61
of the TRIPS Agreement undeniably has helped the demandeur countries to
begin the norm-setting process, greater norm development, unfortunately, will
have to await future negotiations.
D. DISCIPLINARY CHALLENGES: NON-IP, NON-TRADE FACTORS

By design, the international intellectual property system has a rather narrow
focus. Even when the TRIPS Agreement expanded this focus to cover
international trade, the focus covers only some of the issues implicated by the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.78 In fact, with the growing spillover
of issues from intellectual property and international trade to other policy areas,
such as agriculture, health, the environment, education, culture, competition,
free speech, privacy, democracy, and the rule of law,79 a TRIPS-based

77 Reichman & Lange, supra note 5, at 34.
78

As Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji observed:
It does not have the primary
[The WTO is primarily a trade regime.
responsibility for the development of IP norms qua IP norms; instead, IP
protection is viewed through its impact on free trade, which provides a distinct
gloss on the interpretation of TRIPS obligations that often disregards cultural
and other relevant criteria central to both national and international copyright
systems.

P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ

& RUTH

L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON

LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 39 (2008), available at http://
www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf.
79 See Peter K. Yu, InternationalEnclosure, the Regime Complex, and IntellectualProperty SchiZophrenia,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1, 2; see also CORREA, supra note 66, at 12 ("[I]ntellectual property cannot
be regarded in isolation from broader national policies, such as competition and development
policies. In order to contribute to national objectives, the intellectual property system must be
integrated into such policies."); Graeme W. Austin, Valuing "Domestic Self-Determination" in
International Intellectual Property Juirprudence,77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1155, 1193 (2002) ("To the
extent that intellectual property policies and values can be identified, it might be more helpful to
regard them as aspects of much broader issues of public policy. Policies that help ensure that
populations get fed, enjoy the benefits of literacy, are healthy, have viable agricultural bases, and
can participate in technological and cultural development-these seem to be the kinds of policies
that should have priority in any analysis of the values that intellectual property laws are meant to
serve." (footnote omitted)).
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enforcement regime that focuses primarily on the trade bottom line is
unsurprisingly inadequate.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, a well-functioning intellectual property
regime depends on the existence of an "enabling environment" for the effective
The key
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.80
preconditions for successful intellectual property reforms include a
consciousness of legal rights, respect for the rule of law, an effective and
independent judiciary, a well-functioning innovation and competition system,
sufficiently-developed basic infrastructure, a critical mass of local stakeholders,
and established business practices. As Robert Sherwood reminded us in an
aptly titled article, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, "until judicial systems in
developing and transition countries are upgraded, it will matter little what
intellectual property laws and treaties provide." 81 Likewise, Keith Maskus, Sean
Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha noted:
Upgrading protection for IPRs [intellectual property rights] alone
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this purpose [of
maximizing the competitive gains from additional innovation and
technology acquisition over time, with particular emphasis on
raising innovative activity by domestic entrepreneurs and
enterprises]. Rather, the system needs to be strengthened within
a comprehensive and coherent set of policy initiatives that
optimize the effectiveness of IPRs. Among such initiatives are
further structural reform of enterprises, trade and investment
liberalization, promotion of financial and innovation systems to
commercialize new technologies, expansion of educational
opportunities to build human capital for absorbing and
developing technology, and specification of rules for maintaining
82
effective competition in [local] markets.
To some extent, enforcement facilitation-thatis, to provide for measures that
help facilitate enforcement-is just as important as enforcement.
Unfortunately, many of the preconditions needed for such facilitation were
80 See

Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puj.le, in

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 173, 213-16 (discussing

the importance of an "enabling environment" for effective intellectual property protection).
81 Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37,
42

(2002); see also ASSAFA

ENDESHAW,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AsIAN

EMERGING

ECONOMIES: LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-TRIPS ERA 198 (2010) ("In the end, any lapse in the
enforcement of IP merges with the general problem of the establishment of the rule of law, of the
recognition of civil rights and their implementation in practice. In societies where civil rights
have yet to become part of the body politic, it should not make one wonder why IP enforcement
is deficient....").
82 Maskus et al., supranote 38, at 297.
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outside the areas of both intellectual property and trade. Without the needed
support, the TRIPS Agreement understandably cannot fully address the
challenging intellectual property enforcement problems confronting the WTO
members in both the developed and less developed worlds. Even worse, while
the WTO members have explored the need for greater trade facilitation to
support trade,83 they have yet to fully understand the importance of
enforcement facilitation. Many of these countries-whether developed or less
developed-simply do not have the needed political will to push for measures
to make such facilitation possible. 84
In fact, the idea of developing an enabling environment for effective
intellectual property protection was not explored until recently, and such
exploration took place outside the WTO. In the fifth session of the Advisory
Committee on Enforcement of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), WIPO members worked together to "[i]dentify[] elements for
creating an enabling environment for promoting respect for intellectual
property in a sustainable manner and future work."85 As Pakistan noted in a
submission entitled "Creating an Enabling Environment to Build Respect for
IP":
[A] very limited approach to combating infringement of IP rights,
in which, in essence, stricter laws and capacity building of
enforcement agencies is seen as the primary means to ensure
enforcement . . . can temporarily reduce IPR infringements levels,

but cannot address the challenge in a sustainable manner. A
broader strategy is urgently needed to allow the establishment of
conditions in which all countries would have shared
implications
of
understanding
of the socio-economic
enforcement measures, and direct economic interest in taking
such measures. In such an environment, countries' choice to

83 Some commentators have also noted the need for development facilitation. See, e.g., Lee
Yong-Shik, Economic Development and the World Trade Organization: Proposalfor the Agreement on
Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and Development in the WTO, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO, supra note 70, at 291.
84 See MoiSE.s NAiM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING
THE GLOBAL ECoNOMY 257-58 (2005) (noting the lack of political will to adopt measures
required for combating illicit trade); Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the
U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 413 (2008)
(observing that both developed and less developed countries lack the needed political will to put
intellectual property protection at the very top of the policy agenda).
85 ACE, DraftAgenda, WIPO/ACE/5/1 Prov. Rev, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.wi
po.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/en/wipoace_5/wipo-ace_5_1_prov rev.pdf.
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enforce IPRs will be derived from their internal rather than
external factors. 86
In another paper, which heavily criticized the one-size-fits-all model of
intellectual property enforcement, Brazil declared: "Violations of intellectual
property rights do not take place in the void. They are not disconnected from
concrete political and social variables."87 That paper called for a change in the
focus of the WIPO advisory committee: from enforcement to respect for
intellectual property.88 It remains to be seen whether the TRIPS Agreement
and the larger WTO reforms will benefit from a more holistic perspective of
intellectual property enforcement advanced in these papers.
E. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES: NEW INTERNET-RELATED ISSUES

The level of enforcement in the TRIPS Agreement depends on the scope
and extent of its substantive provisions. Although the Agreement was
established in the mid-1990s, shortly before the internet and electronic
commerce entered the mainstream, its substantive standards were set at what
Daniel Gervais described as "the highest common denominator among major
industrialized countries as of 1991."89 As a result, the Agreement failed to
address challenges created by new technologies that emerged after the
completion of its primary draft.90
One of the most significant challenges in the enforcement area to date
concerned the protection of intellectual property rights in the digital
environment. Today, the internet, new communications technologies, and filesharing networks have caused serious and widespread problems of
unauthorized copying throughout the world. Since 2003, the U.S. recording
industry alone has filed lawsuits against more than 35,000 individuals for illegal
distribution of copyrighted works via peer-to-peer networks.9' Courts in the
developed world, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, have also
92
been inundated with cases addressing secondary copyright liability.
Pakistan'sConcept Paper,supra note 68, 2.
87 Future Work Proposal by Brail, pt. C, in ACE, Conclusions by the Chair, Annex 2,
WIPO/ACE/5/11, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/enforcement/
en/wipo-ace_5/wipo-ace_5 1-annex2.pdf.
86

88 See id.

89 Daniel

J.

Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: Histoy and Impact on Economic

Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES

IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
90 See id at 29 ("The 1992 text was not extensively modified and became the basis for the
TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.").
91 Fred von Lohmann, RIAA v. The People Turns from Lawsuits to 3 Strikes, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/12/riaa-v-people-turns-lawsuits-3strikes.
92 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding
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In retrospect, the existence of these internet-related enforcement problems
is no surprise. After all, the TRIPS negotiators from the demandeurcountries did
not anticipate the technological change brought about by the information
revolution. Even if they had anticipated such a change, they likely would not
have succeeded in introducing new norms in this area. Article 27, for example,
provides very limited coverage of biotechnology-related issues, 93 even though
the biotechnology revolution had already raised many difficult policy and ethical
questions at the time of the TRIPS negotiations.94
To some extent, the advent of the internet and new communications
technologies had rendered the TRIPS Agreement obsolete even before it
entered into effect. As Marci Hamilton aptly observed:
Despite its broad sweep and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS
arrives on the scene already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at
the same time that the on-line era became irrevocable. Yet it
makes no concession, not even a nod, to the fact that a significant
portion of the international intellectual property market will soon
be conducted on-line.' 5
Given the novelty of the internet-related challenges and the limited coverage of
TRIPS substantive standards, it is easy to explain why the Agreement failed to
provide effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in the digital
environment-an issue that countries recently tackled in the ACTA
negotiations.96

that the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies could be liable for copyright
infringement committed by individuals using their products if they had "induced" their users to
undertake infringing activities); BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] F.C. 488, affd, [2005]
F.C.A. 193 (Can.) (addressing the issue of whether setting up the facilities to allow copying
amounts to authorizing infringement); Universal Music Austl. Pry Ltd v. Sharman License
Holdings Ltd. (2005) 65 I.P.R. 289 (Austl.) (holding the defendant liable for authorizing users to
infringe on music copyrights and directing it to modify the software application to reduce
infringement).
93 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.2 (allowing each WTO member state to "exclude from
patentability inventions, the prevention . .. of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
avoid serious prejudice to the environment"); id. art. 27.3(b) (permitting each member to exclude
from patentability "plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes').
94 See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 923, 933
(2008) (noting that the biotechnology revolution "not only has resulted in the creation of new
protectable subject matters, but has also sparked many novel ethical debates and controversies").
95 Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprvtective, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614-15 (1996).
96 See ACTA, supra note 11, pmbl. (noting the desires to "address the problem of infringement
of intellectual property rights, including infringement taking place in the digital environment" and
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F. SUMMARY

While commentators are correct that the TRIPS Agreement has transformed

the international intellectual property system by providing comprehensive
international minimum standards on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights for the first time, the Agreement's major strength, paradoxically, is also its
major weakness. Because the Agreement fails to achieve a global consensus on
international intellectual property enforcement, WTO members continue to
face widespread enforcement problems throughout the world. They also
remain in deep disagreement with each other over the appropriate standards for
intellectual property enforcement. It is therefore appropriate for developed
countries to continue to view the enforcement provisions as the Achilles' heel
of the TRIPS Agreement.
From the standpoint of less developed countries, however, the picture is a
little more complicated. In middle-income countries, some economic sectors
are likely to find the TRIPS enforcement provisions weak-a view shared by
Other sectors in these middle-income
those in the developed world.97
countries, however, may take a different view. Instead, these sectors may join
low-income countries in rejoicing in the TRIPS Agreement's failure to
incorporate strong international intellectual property enforcement norms. To
them, the weak enforcement provisions do not constitute the Achilles' Heel of
the TRIPS Agreement. Rather, they are a blessing in disguise!
III. POST-TRIPS

RESPONSES

Given the TRIPS Agreement's failure to achieve a global consensus on
international intellectual property enforcement norms, countries have actively
pushed for the acceptance of their preferred norms in the international
intellectual property system since the adoption of the Agreement. The recent
developments in the enforcement area range from the negotiation of ACTA
among developed and like-minded countries to the staunch resistance of
TRIPS-plus standards by less developed countries in meetings at the Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council).
This Part highlights some of these developments.

to "promote cooperation between service providers and right holders to address relevant
infringements in the digital environment"); id. art. 27 (stipulating provisions for the enforcement
of intellectual property rights in the digital environment).
97 See Yu, supra note 79, at 23-27 (highlighting the regional and sectoral disparities in
intellectual property protection and enforcement within China).
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A. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

1. TRIPS Counil. Although developed countries were well aware of the fact
that they did not get all of their preferred enforcement terms in the TRIPS
Agreement, and they remained deeply dissatisfied with the continuous piracy
and counterfeiting problems in less developed countries, they did not push for
stronger international intellectual property enforcement norms until the mid2000s. The reasons were twofold. First, while the TRIPS Agreement requires
WTO members to fully implement the Agreement within a year after its
entering into force on January 1, 1995, Article 65 delays such implementation in
less developed and transition countries for another four years.98 As a result,
these countries did not need to comply with the TRIPS enforcement standards
until January 1, 2000.
Second, the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations was launched
during the fourth WTO ministerial meeting in Qatar in November 2001.99
Amid post-September 11 sentiments and in the wake of the growing need for
cooperation between the United States and the less developed world, the WTO
members adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health' 00 (Doha Declaration). In that climate, the European Union, Japan, the
United States, and other demandeur countries understandably were reluctant to
push for higher intellectual property enforcement standards in the WTO.
In the mid-2000s, however, the landscape changed. During the TRIPS
Council meeting in June 2006, the European Union called for an "in-depth
discussion" of enforcement issues.101 Together with two earlier proposals,102
the Union's effort to push for greater discussion of intellectual property
enforcement in the TRIPS Council represented the first attempts by a WTO
member to revive such discussion since a flurry of exchanges among WTO

98 TRIPS Agreement art. 65.2-.3. In addition to developing countries, Article 66.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement also granted less developed countries a transitional period of ten years. See id.
art. 66.1. That transition period has now been further extended for another seven and a half years
to July 1, 2013 for those countries that have yet to meet the TRIPS requirements. Press Release,
World Trade Org. [WTO], Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual Property
The
Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres05_e/pr4 24_e.htm.
deadline for the formal introduction of patent protection for pharmaceuticals and of the
protection of undisclosed regulatory data has been further extended to January 1, 2016. World
Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
7,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
99 See Yu, supra note 54, at 512-15 (discussing the Doha Round).
'oo Doha Declaration, supra note 98.
101 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights [TRIPS Council],
Communication from the European Communities, Enfordng Intellectual Property Rights: Border
Measures, IP/C/W/471 (June 9, 2006).
102 TRIPS Council, Communication from the European Communities, Enforcement of Intellectual
Poperty Rights, IP/C/W/468 (Mar. 10, 2006); TRIPS Council, Communication from the
European Communities, Enforcement ofIntellectualPropertyRights, IP/C/W/448 (June 9, 2005).
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members in 1997,103 during the Council's review of TRIPS-related laws and
regulations from developed countries.104 The European Union proposals,
unsurprisingly, were strongly opposed by less developed countries.
In the follow-up TRIPS Council meeting in October 2006, the European
Union, with formal support from Japan, Switzerland, and the United States,
tabled a joint communication seeking to strengthen the implementation of the
TRIPS enforcement provisions. 0 5 As the document declared: "The TRIPS
Council is an appropriate forum to examine and assist Members in the
implementation of enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The
work of the TRIPS Council in this regard should complement Members' efforts
06
Citing
to use other cooperative mechanisms to address IPR enforcement."'
ongoing challenges in the area, the European Union and the paper's
cosponsors:

103 See TRIPS Council, Questions Posed by Hong Kong, China, Review of Legislation on
Enforcement, IP/C/W/81 (Sept. 29, 1997); TRIPS Council, Questions Posed by the European
Communities and Their Member States, Review of Legislaion on Enforcement, IP/C/W/80 (Oct. 1,
1997); TRIPS Council, Questions Posed by Japan, Review ofLegislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/82
(Oct. 8, 1997); TRIPS Council, Questions Posed by the United States, Review of Legislation on
Enforcement, IP/C/W/83 (Oct. 21, 1997); TRIPS Council, Questions Posed by New Zealand,
Review ofLegislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/84 (Oct. 23, 1997); TRIPS Council, Replies from the
European Communities and Their Member States to Questions from Hong Kong China and
Japan, Review of Legislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/87 (Nov. 6, 1997); TRIPS Council, Replies
from Hungary to Questions from the European Communities and their Member States, Japan
and the United States, Review of Legislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/88 (Nov. 12, 1997); TRIPS
Council, Replies from Japan to Questions from the European Communities and their Member
States, Hong Kong-China and the United States, Review of Legislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/89
(Nov. 13, 1997); TRIPS Council, Replies from Bulgaria to Questions Posed by Japan, Review of
Legislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/91 (Nov. 13, 1997); TRIPS Council, Replies from the United
States to Questions from the European Communities and their Member States, Hong Kong
China and Japan, Review ofLegislation on Enforcement, IP/C/W/90 (Nov. 14, 1997).
104 As Duncan Matthews recounted the process in the TRIPS Council:
Once the transitional period for each category of countries has come to an end,
each Member is required to submit two documents for scrutiny by the TRIPs
Council. The first document is a notification attesting to how the national laws
of that country comply with the TRIPS Agreement. This is known as an 'Article
63.2 notification'. The second document is a checklist of issues on enforcement
of intellectual property rights, which is a response by each Member to a
questionnaire sent to it by the TRIPs Council in order to monitor enforcement.
Once these documents have been submitted, that Member is subject to a
scrutiny process, during which all VTO Members (not only those that have
already reached the end of the transitional period) are able to ask additional
questions to ascertain how the national laws of the country under scrutiny are in
accordance with the Agreement.
MATCHEWS, supra note 52, at 80 (footnotes omitted).
105 TRIPS Council, joint Communication from the European Communities, Japan, Switzerland,
and the United States, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 4, IP/C/W/485 (Nov. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Joint Communication].
106 Id.
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Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion
of how to implement the enforcement provisions of TRIPS
in a more effective manner.
Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion
of accompanying measures which could enhance the
effectiveness of national implementing legislation and
enforcement efforts, such as for example promoting
interagency co-operation, fostering a higher public
awareness, and reinforcing institutional frameworks.
Ask the Secretariat to prepare a synopsis of Members'
contributions to the Checklist of Issues on Enforcement 07]
that would serve as a basis for the above-mentioned
discussion.
Stand ready, in cooperation with recipients of technical
assistance and with relevant international organizations, to
better focus the technical assistance they provide in favour
of developing countries in order to facilitate the
implementation of enforcement provisions.108

Although the EU proposal again met with strong opposition from less
developed countries, developed countries refused to give up. During the next
TRIPS Council meeting in January 2007, the United States took its turn to
circulate another paper, sharing its experience on the border enforcement of
intellectual property rights. 09 The document discussed the various techniques
that the United States found helpful in addressing intellectual property
infringement. The United States also called on the TRIPS Council to "make a
positive contribution to addressing [intellectual property enforcement]
problems through a constructive exchange of views and experiences." 0
Although less developed countries found the United States' approach
procedurally acceptable, they insisted that their position "had not changed, and
they still [did] not believe [the enforcement issue] belongs in the TRIPS
Council."' 1 China, with the support of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, and

107 TRIPS Council, Checklist of Issues on Enforcement: First Draft: Note by the Secretariat,IP/C/W/9
(July 28, 1995).
108 Joint Communication, supra note 105, 7.
109 See TRIPS Council, Communication from the United States, Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Paghts (Part III of the TRIPS Agreement): Expenences of Border Enforcement, IP/C/W/488 (Jan. 30,
2007).
110 Id.
1.
II Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, TRIPS Meeting: Boost to IP Issues as Part of Resumed Trade TaAs, US
Submits Enforcement Proposal,INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/we
blog/2007/02/14/trips-meeting-boost-to-ip-issues-as-part-of-resumed-trade-talks-us-submits-en
forcement-proposal/.
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South Africa, stated specifically that "enforcement could not be a permanent
agenda item in the council."" 2
In June 2007, Switzerland introduced another paper on enforcement,
suggesting ways to implement the TRIPS enforcement provisions and to
improve the overall enforcement of intellectual property rights.113 The paper
underscored the need to develop well-functioning communication and
coordination structures in the area of border measures. A few months later,
Japan introduced its own paper, sharing its experiences in the border
enforcement of intellectual property rights while outlining the recent trends in
intellectual property infringements.1 4 Shortly after the release of these papers,
the ACTA negotiations were announced, and developed countries did not table
any new papers on enforcement in the TRIPS Council.
2. Dispute Settlement Body. At the WTO, developed countries have also
explored the use of the dispute settlement process to shape TRIPS enforcement
standards. In the first few years of the organization's existence, there were very
few disputes in the area. In fact, most of the TRIPS disputes-enforcementrelated or otherwise-were disputes between the United States and the
European Communities.1 5 TRIPS enforcement disputes were no exception.
In May 1998, the United States filed complaints against Greece and, by
extension, the European Communities for Greece's failure to provide effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights under Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement." 6 Those complaints were quickly settled.
The lack of developing country targets for WTO disputes over inadequate
intellectual property enforcement, however, changed when China joined the
WTO in December 2001.11 Although the United States had repeated disputes
with China over piracy and counterfeiting since the mid-1980s,118 the United
112

Id
TRIPS Council, Communication from Switzerland, Enforcement of Intellectual Propety Rghts:
Communication and Coordinationas a Ky to Effetive BorderMeasures, IP/C/W/492 (May 31, 2007); see also
Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Quiet TRIPS Council Meeting Expected; Enforcement Push Continues, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (June 1, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/06/01/quiet-trips-council-m
eeting-expected-enforcement-push-continues/ (reporting Switzerland's proposal).
114 TRIPS Council, Communication from Japan, Enforcement of Intellectual Propery Rights,
IP/C/W/501 (Oct. 11, 2007).
"5 See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners(Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-lWTO
China, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 901, 932-34 (2006) (listing the TRIPS disputes from 1995 to March
2006).
116 Request for Consultations by the United States, Greece-Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/1 (May 7, 1998); Request for
Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Enforcement of Intellectual Poperty Rights
forModon Picturesand Television Programs,WT/DS124/1 (May 7, 1998).
117 On December 11, 2001, China formally became the 143rd member of the international
trading body. See Symposium, China and the IfTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. AsiAN
L. 1, 2 (2003) (remarks of the Author).
11s For discussions of ongoing disputes between China and the United States over the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, see generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
113
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States Trade Representative (USTR) did not seriously consider the filing of a
WTO complaint against China until the mid-2000s.11 9 There were several
reasons. First, the USTR, and, to some extent, the United States intellectual
property industries, were willing to be patient in the first few years following
China's accession to the WTO. Indeed, the USTR did not put China back on
20
to the priority watch list until April 2005 after its out-of-cycle review.1
Moreover, the USTR was busy collecting evidence on inadequate intellectual
property protection and enforcement in China while exploring the best strategy
The
to challenge China's noncompliance with the TRIPS Agreement.121
existence of Article 41.5,122 the many ambiguities that have been built into the
TRIPS enforcement provisions,1 23 and the repeatedly-extended moratorium on
non-violation complaints1 24 certainly did not help the United States' case.
In April 2007, the United States finally requested consultations with China
concerning the latter's failure to protect and enforce intellectual property rights
pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.125 The complaint focused on four particular
issues: (1) the high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the
intellectual property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to
properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the denial of

to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131
(2000); Yu, supranote 115; Yu, supra note 80.
119 See Yu, supra note 115, at 923-46; see also Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of
the Trade Act of 1974: Request for Public Comment on Out-of-Cycle Review of the People's
Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 74561 (Dec. 14, 2004) (providing a notice that requested public
comments in the USTR's Section 301 review of countries); Request for Comments and Notice of
Public Hearing Concerning China's Compliance with WTO Commitments, 70 Fed. Reg. 44714
(Aug. 3, 2005) (providing another notice requesting for public comments concerning China's
compliance with its WTO commitments).
120 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. [USTR], Out-Of-Cycle Review Results 8 (2005), http://ustraderep
gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports_ Publications/2005/2005_Special301 /assetupload.fil
e835_7647.pdf.
121See Yu, supra note 115, at 923-46.
122 See id. at 935 (discussing the challenges posed by Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement to the
United States' WTO case against China).
123 See WATAL, supra note 13, at 385 (noting that "the USTR has openly admitted to difficulties
in litigating the enforcement provisions of TRIPS on account of their ambiguity").
124 See TRIPS Agreement art. 64 (providing a moratorium on nonviolation complaints); see also
Yu, supra note 52, at 1029-30 (discussing the extension of this moratorium). But see Daniel
Gervais, China-MeasuresAffecting the Protection and Enforcement of IntellectualProperty Rights, 103 AM.
J. INT'L L. 549, 549 (2009) (noting that the WTO panel's analysis in China may have "blurred
both the traditional distinction between 'as such' and 'as applied' claims and the line separating
TRIPS violations from non-violations"); Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The
PotentialUtility ofiNon-Violation Disputes, 12J. INT'L ECON. L. 1023, 1059 (2009) ("Given the lack of
detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation
complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining about was that a benefit it
expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement.").
125 Request for Consultations by the United States, China-MeasuresAffecting the Protection and
Enforcement ofIntellectualPrpertyRights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).
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copyright protection to works that have not been authorized for publication or
dissemination within China; and (4) the unavailability of criminal procedures
and penalties for infringing activities that involved either reproduction or
distribution, but not both.126
After consultations between the two parties failed to resolve the dispute,
leading to the resolution of only the last claim, the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) established a panel to examine the three unresolved claims.127 In January
2009, the DSB released its long-awaited panel report on China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Properly Rights.128 While China
prevailed on the claim on criminal thresholds, the United States won the
censorship claim. The remaining customs claim was somewhat divided
between the two parties, with each side declaring victory.129
The limited length and scope of this Article do not allow me to address in
full the key arguments made by both parties and the panel report's major
findings-a task I have already undertaken elsewhere.1 30 Nevertheless, it is fair
to view the dispute's outcome as a tie between the two parties. It is also worth
noting that none of the parties appealed the report. Thus, the dispute
effectively ended after China amended its copyright law and customs
regulations in spring 2010.131
From the standpoint of WTO jurisprudence, this dispute is important; it
represents the first time a WTO panel focused primarily on the interpretation
and implementation of the TRIPS enforcement provisions.132 The report not
See id.
127 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China-MeasuresAffeting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007). The only
claim that had been resolved concerned the unavailability of criminal procedures and penalties for
infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution, but not both.
128 TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8.
129Compar Press Release, USTR, United States Wins WTO Dispute Over Deficiencies in China's
Intellectual Property Rights Laws (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press
-releases/2009/january/united-states-wins-wto-dispute-over-deficiencies-c ("These findings are an
important victory, because they confirm the importance of IPR protection and enforcement, and
clarify key enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement."), with ICTSD, Ruling in US-China
PiragDispute Raises Controvery, BRIDGES WKLY., Jan. 28, 2009, at 7, available at http://ictsd.org/i/ne
ws/bridgeweekly/38830/ (reporting that Yao Jian, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce, "welcomed" the verdict on criminal thresholds, but expressed "regret" about the
unfavorable aspects of the ruling and maintained that his government was "making a further
assessment of the Dispute Settlement Body panel report").
130See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Yu,
supra note 60.
131See Yu, supra note 130.
132 This panel report, however, is not the first one involving a TRIPS provision concerning the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. In United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appmpiations
Act of 1998, the WTO panel and subsequently the Appellate Body examined Section 211 of the
U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 in relation to Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Section 211 Panel Report, supra note 3; Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
AppropiationsActof 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002).
126
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only provides certainty and clarity to a WTO member's TRIPS enforcement
obligations, but also enables the United States to receive redress of some of its
complaints over inadequate intellectual property protection and enforcement in
China. Nevertheless, the panel's narrow focus and the limited scope of its
findings clearly revealed the TRIPS Agreement's shortcomings in the
enforcement area.' 33 Such revelation, in turn, provided the momentum needed
for developed countries to push for stronger international intellectual property
enforcement norms both within and without the WTO. While the negotiation
of ACTA had already begun more than a year before the release of this panel
report, the outcome of the dispute most certainly has strengthened the ACTA
demandeurs' resolve to develop higher international benchmarks for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.
3. ACTA. For the first fifteen years of the WTO's existence, developed
countries have had very limited success in pushing for higher international
intellectual property enforcement standards within the organization-through
either the TRIPS Council or the mandatory dispute settlement process.
Although WTO members sought to make a similar push in WIPO,134 the other
traditional forum for setting international intellectual property norms, that
forum was equally hostile. With the establishment of the WIPO Development
Agenda in October 2004135 and the adoption of forty-five recommendations for
the agenda three years later,136 WIPO does not provide an ideal forum for
developing new and higher international intellectual property enforcement
norms.137

133See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, China-IntellectualProperty Rights: Implicationsfor the TRIPSPlus Border Measures, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620, 626 (2010) (noting that the panel's
clarifications on the limited scope of the TRIPS Agreement have hinted at the "rationale for
several TRIPS-plus initiatives in the field of border measures").
134See Yu, supra note 11 (discussing the developed countries' push for the development of
stronger international intellectual property enforcement norms at WIPO).
135 WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in
Document, WO/GA/31 /11, IIM/1 /4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdo
cs/mdocs/en/iiml /iiml4.pdf.
136 Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO (Oct. 1,
2007), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article0071.html; see also The 45 Adopted
Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ip-developmen
t/en/agenda/recommendations.htm
(last visited July 6, 2008) (listing the forty-five
recommendations for actions).
137 See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Ani-Counterfeiing Trade Agreement on the
Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Ofice of the U.S. Trade Representativefor the Creation of IP
Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 24, 26 (1999)
("The decision to use a plurilateral coalition to create new global standards reflects increasing
disillusion with WIPO as a norm-setting venue because of its lack of enforcement power.");
Michael Geist, The ACIA Threat to the Future of WIPO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/14/the-acta-threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/
(relating
the Canadian officials' suggestion that the establishment of ACTA may be attributable to the "the
perceived stalemate at WIPO, where the growing emphasis on the Development Agenda and the

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2011

33

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6
512

J.INTELL

PROP.L

[Vol. 18:479

On October 23, 2007, two weeks after the adoption of these
recommendations, USTR Susan Schwab formally announced the United States'
intent to negotiate a new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement with its key
trading partners. 38
The European Union and Japan made similar but
independent announcements. In addition to Japan, the United States, and the
European Union-the usual trilateral alliance for heightened intellectual
property protection-the initial negotiating parties included Canada, Mexico,
New Zealand, South Korea, and Switzerland. As the USTR press release
declared: "Mhe goal [of the agreement] is to set a new, higher benchmark for
enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis.... The envisioned
ACTA will include commitments in three areas: (1) strengthening international
cooperation, (2) improving enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong
legal framework for IPR enforcement."1 39
Since the announcement, eleven rounds of negotiations have been held.140
Thirty-seven countries participated in the negotiations for close to four years,141
with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates joining them initially in the first
round of negotiations.
Although the ACTA negotiation process was
unprecedentedly secret, leading to widespread criticism by policymakers,
academic commentators, consumer advocates, and civil liberty groups, the
negotiation documents slowly leaked onto the internet.142 In April 2010, the
negotiating governments finally agreed to release a mutually-vetted draft
agreement text.143
As shown in this draft text, as well as other texts that have since been
officially released, ACTA contains six different chapters: (1) initial provisions
and definitions; (2) legal framework for enforcement of intellectual property
rights; (3) enforcement practices; (4) international cooperation; (5) institutional
arrangements; and (6) final provisions.144 Chapter II, which is the most

heightened participation of developing countries and non-governmental organisations have
stymied attempts by countries such as the United States to bull their way toward new treaties with
little resistance').
138 Press Release, USTR, Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade
Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), http://ustraderep.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressRele
ases/2007/October/AmbassadorSchwabAnnouncesUSWill_SeekNewTradeAgreement
to-FightFakes.html.
139 Id.
14 These eleven rounds of negotiations were held in Geneva, Washington, Tokyo, Paris, Rabat,
Seoul, Guadalajara, Wellington, Lucerne, Washington, and Tokyo.
141 In addition to Japan, the United States, Switzerland, and members of the European Union,
the thirty-seven participants include Australia, Canada, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, and South Korea.
142 See Yu, supra note 11.
143 Press Release, USTR, The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Releases Draft Text of
ACTA (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/of
ficee-us-trade-representative-releases-draft-text-a.
144 ACTA, supra note 11.
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controversial and longest part of the agreement, is subdivided into five different
sections: (a) general obligations; (b) civil enforcement; (c) border measures; (d)
criminal enforcement; and (e) enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
digital environment. 145
While countries continue to explore ACTA's
consistency with their existing domestic laws and international treaty
obligations, the agreement was finally adopted on April 15, 2011, and is now
open for signature. 146
To a great extent, the ACTA negotiations make salient the TRIPS
Agreement's failure to meet the enforcement needs of developed countries,
which already existed before the beginning of the Uruguay Round. Toward the
end of the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations, the previous round of GATT
talks, the United States, with strong support from Levi Strauss, pushed for the
development of an anti-counterfeiting code.147 Although the United States'
late-developing effort failed in the end, earning support from only the
European Communities, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland, it led to the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round. The Punta del
Este Declaration stated specifically that "[n]egotiations shall aim to develop a
multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with
internationaltradein counteifeitgoods."1 48
Interestingly, despite the demandeur countries' success in establishing the
TRIPS Agreement, the Agreement has failed to satisfactorily address those
issues that precipitated the negotiations in the first place. As a result, countries
now need to develop ACTA in part to address some of those challenging issues.
This time, the demandeur countries opted for a plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement among like-minded countries, in lieu of a multilateral anticounterfeiting code within the GATT/WTO framework. The use of this
"country club" approach' 49 has been particularly controversial; it has raised
difficult questions concerning the future efforts by less developed countries to
shape international intellectual property enforcement norms. It has also
instilled doubts about the legitimacy of many of the new norms created through

Id. arts. 6-27.
Ptess Release, Jp. Ministry of Foreign Aff., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
(Opening for Signature) (May 1, 2011), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/
2011/5/0501_01.html.
147 See MATTHEWS, supra note 52, at 9 (discussing the push for an anti-counterfeiting code
during the Tokyo Round); SELL, supra note 14, at 40-41 (same). The draft code was circulated in
1982 as the draft Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods
(document L/5382). See Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [TRIPS Negotiating Group], Meeting of 25 March
1987: Note by the Secretariat 15, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 (Apr. 10, 1987), available at http://www.
wto.org/gattdocs/English/sulpdf/92020076.pdf.
148 Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 42, at 1626 (emphasis added).
149 See Yu, supra note 11 (discussing this "country club" approach).
145

146
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ACTA or other bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade and investment
agreements.
To be certain, the ACTA negotiating parties did not sidestep the WTO
without trying to strengthen enforcement norms within the forum. As Part
III.A has shown, at one time or another, all the key ACTA negotiating partiesJapan, the United States, the European Union, and Switzerland-tabled their
Nevertheless, the
own papers on enforcement in the TRIPS Council.
multilateral
traditional
this
negotiate
outside
to
willingness of these countries
forum when they did not achieve their preferred outcome does raise challenging
questions about the WTO's future role in the development of international
intellectual property enforcement norms.
B. LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

1. TRIPS Council. Although less developed countries have always preferred
enforcement standards that are better tailored to their resource-deficient
environments, until recently they were reluctant to take proactive efforts in
pushing for their preferred international intellectual property enforcement
norms. 50 Instead, they merely registered their concerns over high enforcement
norms while resisting the developed countries' attempt to push for the
establishment of these standards in the TRIPS Council.
For example, at the June 2006 TRIPS Council meeting discussed earlier,
leading developing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, and India,
responded by strongly opposing the EU proposal, citing distractions from the
WTO trade talks, which they claimed were "supposed to focus on
development." 51 As noted by a Chinese official, the TRIPS Council is "not the
right time or right place" to discuss enforcement.152 In China's view, the DSB
should handle intellectual property enforcement issues at the WTO instead. 53
In the follow-up meeting in October 2006, less developed countries again
noted their strong opposition to the European Union's joint communication
with Japan, Switzerland, and the United States-this time, largely on procedural
grounds.15 4 As a result, the European Union did not have an opportunity to
15oThere were many different reasons for a lack of a proactive approach. For example, less
developed countries did not have sufficient bargaining power. Except for a rare few-like Brazil,
India, and most recently China-many of these countries were not sufficiently organized to
articulate their preferred positions. Even more complicated, the positions of the leading
developed countries slowly evolved, due largely to the countries' rapid economic growth and
changing economic structure.
1s1 EU Gets Little Supportfor Enforcement Proposalat WTO; CBD Issue Unresolved, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (June 16, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/06/16/eu-gets-little-support-fo
r-enforcement-proposal-at-wto-cbd-issue-unresolved/.
152 Id.
153 See TRIPS Council Issues Still Aive for WTO Ministenal, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2005/10/28/trips-council-issues-still-alive-for-wto-ministerial/.
154 See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WITO TRIPS Council Stumbles Over Inclusion of Enforcement, INTELL.
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make a formal presentation of its proposal. Instead, it made a statement, and its
proposal was subsequently rejected.
The negative reactions to the EU proposals from less developed countries
were understandable. These countries already had great difficulty in complying
with the high standards required by the TRIPS Agreement following the
expiration of the transitional periods.'"5 In effect, they were dealing with what
Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis described as the "Uruguay Round
'hangover' "' 56-or,
more specifically in the intellectual property context,
"TRIPS Veisalgia."' 5 7 It is, therefore, understandable why these countries were
very concerned when developed countries sought to push for the establishment
of new and higher TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-extra standards through ACTA and
other bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade and investment agreements. 58
Less developed countries also feared that a greater discussion of the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement would eventually open them up to
future challenges over non-compliance in the enforcement area. 59 To many of
these countries, compliance issues should be addressed only through the use of
Some less developed
the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.
countries also feared that a greater discussion of enforcement issues in the
TRIPS Council would lead to unconstructive "finger pointing" that would slow
60
down the Council's work while creating unnecessary distractions.1
2. Dispute Settlement Body. Similar to the disappointing stance taken by less

developed countries in the TRIPS Council, their participation in the WTO
dispute settlement process has been largely on the defensive end. The first
TRIPS dispute that led to the establishment of a WTO panel, for example,
involved India as a respondent. In this dispute, the United States and later the
European Communities successfully challenged, through parallel proceedings,
India's failure to establish a mailbox system in its patent law pursuant to Article

PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/10/27/wto-trips-council-st
umbles-over-inclusion-of-enforcement/ (recounting the disagreement between developed and less
developed countries over how to address intellectual property enforcement in the TRIPS Council).
155 See Yu, supra note 13, at 379-86 (discussing the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on less
developed countries).
156 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LAW, ECONoMICS, AND POLITICS 111 (2007).
157 Coined by the Author.
158 See Yu, supra note 17, at 867-69 (noting the distinction between TRIPS-plus and TRIPSextra obligations).
159 See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Developed Countries Seek to Elevate Enforcement Measures in TRIPS
Coundl, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2006/10/25/
(noting that "the
developed-countries-seek-to-elevate-enforcement-measures-in-trips-council/
paper carries the implied threat [by developed countries] that countries failing to provide
'adequate' protection of intellectual property rights ultimately could be found not to be in
compliance with TRIPS").
160 Gerhardsen, supra note 154.
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70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement. 161 The result was a clear-cut victory for the
United States and the European Communities.
Similarly, in Bratil-MeasuresAffecting Patent Protection, a case concerning the
local working requirement in patent law, Brazil served as a respondent.162 This
complaint, however, was settled a year later, shortly after Brazil filed a
retaliatory complaint challenging United States patent law for violations of
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement.163 Brazil's complaint marked the
first time a less developed country filed a TRIPS complaint against a developed
country. Nevertheless, the two disputes were quickly settled, and Brazil lost its
opportunity to use the WTO dispute settlement process to shape the
interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Apart from Brazil and India, Argentina, China, Indonesia, and Pakistan all
have appeared on the respondent side of the TRIPS-related complaints in the
WTO's first fifteen years of existence.164 Although all of these complaints were
filed by either the United States or the European Union, developing countries
in recent years have made more frequent use of the WTO dispute settlement
process to resolve non-TRIPS disputes.165 Their ability to take advantage of the
process also has improved greatly.

161Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, India-PatentProtectionfor PharmaceuticalandAgricultural
ChemicalProducts,WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
162Request for Consultations by the United States, Bra#jl-Measures Affecting Patent Protection,
WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
163Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-U.S. Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7,
2001).
164 These complaints, in chronological order, were: Request for Consultations by the United
States, Pakistan-PatentProtection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS36/1
(May 6, 1996); Request for Consultations by the United States, Indonesia-CertainMeasuresAffecting
the Automobile Industry, WT/DS59/1 (Oct. 15, 1996); Request for Consultations by the United
States, Argentina-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticalsand Test Data Protectionfor AgriculturalChemicals,
WT/DS171/1 (May 10, 1999); Request for Consultations by the United States, Argendna-Certain
Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS196/1 (June 6, 2000); Request for
Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007). See generally Viviana Mufioz Tellez,
Dispute Settlement Under the TRIPS Agreement: The United States-Bra!j/ (2000) and United StatesArgentina (2002) Patent Disputes, in 2

RESEARCH HANDBOOK

ON

THE PROTECTION

OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 215 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (discussing the
United States' WTO complaints against Argentina and Brazil).
165See Davey, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that "the US and the EC no longer were as dominant
as complainants in the system" and that "developing country use of the system increased
dramatically" in the second half of the first decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement
process); see also David Evans & Gregory C. Shaffer, Introduction in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE
WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo MelendexOrtiz eds., 2010) (noting that "no African country has ever initiated a [WTO] dispute" and that
"only one Least Developed Country ... initiated a dispute, and that dispute did not progress
beyond the consultation phase (Bangladesh)").
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For example, in the U.S.-China dispute, although China was still a
respondent, it was able to defend its position admirably before the DSB. Given
the dispute's serious ramifications for the less developed world, six developing
countries-Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey-also
participated in the panel proceedings as third parties. 166 Except for India and
Turkey, all of them either provided a written submission to or made an oral
statement before the WTO panel. Perhaps because of their more active
participation, less developed countries seemed to have had greater success in
this dispute than in the earlier ones.
As the panel report has shown, less developed countries were able to score
some important points that are likely to influence the future interpretation and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.167 For example, the panel report
underscores both the importance of having minimum standards and flexibilities
in the TRIPS Agreement and the longstanding treatment of intellectual property
rights as private rights. It also rejects the use of bilateral, plurilateral, or regional
trade agreements to divine meaning in the TRIPS language. In addition, the
report demonstrates an appreciation of the divergent local market conditions in
each WTO member while continuing the use of an evidence-based approach
for resolving WTO disputes. The panel's discussion of Article 41.5 also hints at
its willingness to consider evidence in cases where resource demands in the area
of intellectual property enforcement have exceeded those in other areas of law
enforcement. Thus, as I observed in another article, although policymakers,
industries, and commentators have largely focused on the gains and losses of
China and the United States, the less developed world-whether intended or
not-may very well have become the dispute's ultimate winner.168
A year after the release of this panel report, India and Brazil filed complaints
against the European Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of
in-transit generic drugs. 169 These complaints marked the second time less
developed countries used the WTO dispute settlement process to address

166 TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 8,
1.6. For discussions of third party
participation in the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally Chad P. Bown, MFN and the
Third-Pary Economic Interests of Developing Countries in GATT/IVTO Dispute Settlement, in
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO, supra note 70, at 265; Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt,
With a Little Help from Our Friends? Developing County Complaints and Third-Party Particpation,in
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO, supra note 70, at 247.

167For a more detailed discussion of points raised in this paragraph, see Yu, supra note 60.
168 See id.

169 Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic
Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010); Request for Consultations by Brazil, European
Union and a Member State-Seirye of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010). See
generally Frederick M. Abbott, Seiryre of Generic Pharmaceuticalsin Transit Based on Allegations of Patent
Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Wefare, 1 WIPO J. 43 (2009)
(discussing issues concerning the seizure of in-transit generic drugs in Europe).
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TRIPS concerns. They also represent the first attempt by less developed
countries to challenge TRIPS-plus standards-enforcement or otherwise.
It remains to be seen whether any of these complaints will lead to the
establishment of a WTO panel, and therefore further interpretation and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. However, the European Union's
recent agreement with Indiao70 to amend its regulation on customs border
measures' 7' already suggests the growing ability of less developed countries to
take advantage of the WTO dispute settlement process-and in this case, to
negotiate in the shadow of a WTO complaint.172 Even if India ultimately settles
with the European Union, the dispute between Brazil and the European Union
could still remain.
3. TRIPS Council: Part Deux. Although less developed countries initially
were rather defensive in the TRIPS Council and before the DSB, their positions
changed significantly last year. In addition to the complaints India and Brazil
filed against the European Union and the Netherlands, both China and India
made important interventions at the TRIPS Council meeting in June 2010,
largely in response to the release of the draft ACTA text, as well as the highly
disturbing trend concerning TRIPS-plus enforcement standards.173
As China explained, TRIPS-plus enforcement standards could cause a wide
variety of systemic problems within the international trading system.174 For
example, they could raise potential legal conflicts with the TRIPS Agreement as
well as other agreements within the WTO.s75 By increasing the complexity of
intellectual property rules, they could also make the international legal
framework highly unpredictable, thus posing barriers to legitimate trade. 7 6 In
addition, the TRIPS-plus standards may upset the delicate balance struck in the

170 See India-EU Generic Drug Row 'Resolved" at Brussels Summit, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11971568.
171 Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Actions Against Goods Suspected of
Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7.
172 See Gregory Shaffer, Recogniging Public Goods in IVTO Dispute Settlement- Who Paniaates?Who
Decides? The Case of TRIPS and PharmaceuticalPatent Protection, 7 J. INT'L EcON. L. 459, 476-77
(2004) (noting the importance of negotiation "in the shadow of" the WTO dispute settlement
process); see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the
E4erience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
AND NAFTA 219, 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (arguing that "the use of legal adjudication allows
developing countries to gain better outcomes in negotiations with their powerful trade partners
than they could in a bilateral negotiation outside of the institution"); Yu, supra note 13, at 392-96
(noting the importance for less developed countries to take advantage of the WTO dispute
settlement process).
173 See TRIPS Council, Minutes of Meeting T 250, 264, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
TRIPS Council Minutes].
174 See id. T 248-263. China's June 9 statement was reprinted as The Problems with the "TRIPS
plus" Enforcement Trend.- China's View, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 13.
175 See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 173,
252-253.
176 See id.1254.
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TRIPS Agreement through an arduous multiyear negotiation process. 77 The
standards could also build harmful technological barriers while raising concerns
about resource misallocation, 7 8 an issue that was raised in the U.S.-China
TRIPS enforcement dispute. 79 China concluded its intervention by advancing
a proposal on specific safeguard principles against the ongoing push for TRIPSplus enforcement standards.o80
Supporting China's position, India followed up by drawing attention to
these and other systemic problems created by TRIPS-plus standards.181 Of
primary concern to India was the push for ACTA and other TRIPS-plus
standards, which it claimed would upset the balance in the TRIPS
Agreement.182 The second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
states specifically that "Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement,
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement."1 83 To India, as well as other policymakers and commentators, this
particular sentence delineates one of the Agreement's maximum standards, or
the so-called "ceilings."1 84 Article 1.1 therefore prohibits members from
See id.1255.
See id. 256-258.
179 See Yu, supranote 60 (discussing China's arguments in relations to Article 41.5).
180 See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 173, 259.
181 See id. 264-273; see also TRIPS Council, Communicationfrom India, Intervention on TRIPS Plus
Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted as Why 'IPR Enforcement" in ACIA & FTAs Harm the
South, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 10 [hereinafter India's TRIPS Council Intervention] (collecting
the speech for India's intervention).
182 As the Indian delegate lamented:
[The] higher levels of protection are likely to disturb the balance of rights and
obligations in the Agreement enshrined, interalia [sic], in the Preamble, the
Objectives and Principles (Art 7-8) and have the potential to constrain the
flexibilities and policy space provided by the TRIPS Agreement to developing
country Members like India particularly in areas such as public health,
technology transfer, socio-econormic development, promotion of innovation and
access to knowledge. They could also potentially negate decisions taken
multilaterally such as the Doha Declaration on Public Health in WTO and the
Development Agenda in WIPO.
India's TRIPS Council Intervention, supranote 181, at 10.
183 TRIPS Agreement art. 1.
184 As India declared:
Although TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum levels
agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they contravene TRIPS
Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified on the basis of Art 1:1 since
the same provision also states that more extensive protection may only be
granted "provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of
this Agreement".
In addition to laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement also
provides "ceilings", some of which are mandatory and clearly specified in the
TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement has achieved a very
careful balance of the interests of the right holders on the one hand, and societal
"

178
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implementing more extensive protection than required by the Agreement if
such additional protection contravenes the Agreement.' 85
India further claimed that the introduction of TRIPS-plus standards "could
short-change legal processes, impede legitimate competition and shift the
escalated costs of enforcing private commercial right to governments,
consumers and tax payers."186 In its view, the standards represent "a systemic
threat to the rights of legitimate traders and producers of goods and
fundamental rights of due process for individuals." 87 These standards may also
upset resource allocation while having strong trade-distorting effects.' 88
In addition, India lamented the fact that "IPR negotiations in [regional trade
agreements] and plurilateral processes like ACTA completely bypassed the
existing multilateral processes."' 89 These negotiations have harmed multilateral
trade by undermining the "systemic checks" against trade protectionism that
had been built into the WTO framework.190 Through cross referencing, the
resulting bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements may also implicate nonsignatory members of the WTO.191 India concluded its intervention with a
trenchant critique of ACTA, covering issues that ranged from customs seizure
of in-transit generic drugs to the restriction of TRIPS flexibilities to the
92
inconsistencies between ACTA and the Doha Declaration.1
Compared to the earlier passive resistance put up by less developed
countries in the TRIPS Council, the interventions recently made by China and
India signaled a more active agenda on the enforcement front. Their positions
were not only well-conceived, but also strongly supported by both the text and
the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the Punta del
Este Declaration stated clearly that the goal of the TRIPS negotiations was to
"ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do
not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade."' 93 During the TRIPS
negotiations, Brazil registered concern over three sets of issues that it believed
"should receive priority attention in the discussions":194
interests, including development-oriented concerns on the other. Enforcement
measures cannot be viewed in isolation of the Objectives contained in Art

7....
India's TRIPS Council Intervention, supra note 181, at 10-11 (emphasis added); see also TRIPS
265, 272.
Council Minutes, supra note 173,
185 See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Cratng Barers to Internadonal Trade?
ACTA Border Measuresand Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2011).
186 TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 173,1265.
187 Id.
188 See id.T266.
189 Id. 267.
190 Id.
191 See id.268.
192
193
194

See id $ 269-271.
Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 42.
TRIPS Negotiating Group, Submissionfom Bra#l
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(1) The extent to which rigid and excessive protection of IPRs
impedes the access to latest technological developments,
restricting, therefore, the participation of developing countries to
international trade?
(2) The extent to which abusive use of IPRs gives rise to
restrictions and distortions in international trade?
(3) The risks that a rigid system of IPRs protection implies for
95
international trade.
A year later, India reminded the delegates that "it was only the restrictive and
anti-competitive practices of the owners of the IPRs that could be considered
to be trade-related because they alone distorted or impeded international
trade."' 96
In the end, the first recital of the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement echoes
the negotiating mandate outlined in the Punta del Este Declaration. It states
explicitly that the drafters desired "to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to . . . ensure that measures

and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade."1 97 As Carlos Correa reminded us, "higher
levels of IPR protection may create barriers to legitimate trade"-a key concern
98
of both the WTO and the TRIPS Agreement.'
In sum, the TRIPS Council interventions from China and India, along with
the WTO complaints that India and Brazil filed against the European Union
and the Netherlands, have suggested a more proactive approach on the part of
less developed countries to shaping the development of international
intellectual property enforcement norms. This approach is highly promising,
considering the fact that Brazil, China, and India represent the three leading
voices in the less developed world. As their economic strengths-and therefore
political leverage-grow,199 the evolution of the international intellectual
property regime is likely to be more dynamic and multidirectional. Such
evolution will become even more intriguing if these countries are willing to
200
establish a united front that negotiates on behalf of the less developed world.

1988) [hereinafter Submissionfrm Bra!l|.
195 Id.
196 TRIPS Negotiating Group, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 12-14 juy 1989: Note b the
Secretariat 5, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989).
197 TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 1.
198 CORREA, supra note 66, at 25.
199 See Yu, supra note 53, at 358-62 (discussing the emerging strength of these BRIC countries).
200 See generally Peter K. Yu, BuildingIntellectual Property Coaltonsfor Development, in IMPLEMENTING
THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 79 (Jeremy de
Beer ed., 2009) (discussing how the development of "intellectual property coalitions for
development" can help less developed countries strengthen their collective bargaining position,
influence negotiation outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decision-making in the
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IV. LESSONS

The TRIPS Agreement's limited success in achieving a consensus on
international intellectual property enforcement norms has led to great
uncertainty over the future evolution of the global intellectual property system.
Nevertheless, the continuous battle between developed and less developed
countries in the norm-setting area provides policymakers, commentators, and
rights holders with four important lessons. The first two focus on the TRIPS
Agreement, and the last two concern either developed or less developed
countries.
A. LESSON 1: TRIPS AND CONTINUITY

Commentators have described how the TRIPS Agreement brought about a
"sea change" or a "tectonic shift" in international intellectual property law. 201
However, as Professor Okediji cautioned us in her discussion of the recent
trends of establishing TRIPS-plus bilateral agreements:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement should never have been understood as a
crowning
point
of international
intellectual
property
regulation.... [It]
remains an important
hallmark
of
international intellectual property law, but it very well may just
have been a pause-albeit a significant one-in the historical
progress of bilateral commercial treaties used as instruments of
foreign relations by the United States. 202
Indeed, as Part III has shown, the TRIPS negotiations and post-TRIPS
developments represent an ongoing contest between developed and less
developed countries over their preferred international intellectual property
standards. 203 While developed countries successfully pushed for the inclusion

international intellectual property regime).
201 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD EcoNoMY 3 (2007) (stating that "the TRIPS Agreement represented a sea
change in the international regulation of IPRs"); WATAL, supra note 13, at 2 ("TRIPS is, by far, the
most wide-ranging and far reaching international treaty on the subject of intellectual property to
date and marks the most important milestone in the development of international law in this
area."); Charles R. McManis, Teaching Current Trends and Future Developments in IntellectualProperty, 52
ST. Louis U. L.J. 855, 856 (2008) (noting that "the field of international intellectual property law
underwent a tectonic shift with the promulgation of the [TRIPS Agreement]").
202 Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Snngs in International Intellectual Property
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. &TECH. J. 125, 130, 146-47 (2003-2004).
203 See Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Poliy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and
Settlement, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 267 (2004) (discussing the repeated process of contestation and
settlement in the intellectual property arena); Yu, supra note 3, at 328 (noting that the international
intellectual property regime is the product of repeated interactions between an evolving set of
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of their preferred standards in the TRIPS Agreement, less developed countries
were able to inject ambiguities, flexibilities, limitations, and exceptions into the
Agreement. Among the important TRIPS safeguards less developed countries
succeeded in introducing are Articles 1.1, 7, 8, 40, and 41.5 (in addition to the
transitional provisions). All of these provisions-in particular Articles 7 and 8,
which lay down the Agreement's overarching objectives and normative
principles-may provide opportunities for less developed countries to push for
a recalibration of the balance in the existing international intellectual property
system. 204
Given the ongoing contest between developed and less developed countries,
it is no surprise that commentators have viewed the TRIPS Agreement as a
work in progress. As Carolyn Deere reminded us: "After a decade of tense
North-South debates, TRIPS emerged a contested agreement. It was quickly
apparent that far from a final deal, TRIPS was rather the starting point for
further negotiations ... . "205 Susan Sell concurred: "The TRIPS agreement is
206
Whether
hardly the end of the story. In many ways, it is just the beginning."
the balance in the international intellectual property system will be further
adjusted will depend on whether these countries and their supporters can
207
sufficiently mobilize to recalibrate such a balance.
B. LESSON 2: ENFORCEMENT AS A MUTUAL BENEFIT

A country's interest in setting new and higher international intellectual
property enforcement norms depends largely on the overall structure of the
global intellectual property system and the substantive benefits that country can
derive from reforming the system. As less developed countries continue to
push for greater protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
to some extent, geographical indicationS209-they
expressionS208-and

currents and crosscurrents).
204 For a detailed discussion of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, see generally Yu, supra
note 52.
205 DEERE, supra note 40, at 304.
206 SELL, supra note 14, at 121.

207See Sell, supra note 203, at 319-21.
208For the Author's earlier views on the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural
expressions, see generally Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intelkctual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REv. 433 (2008).
209 See, e.g.,

PHILIPPE CULLET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 333-37 (2005) (discussing how geographical indications can serve as a tool for
protecting traditional knowledge); Dwijen Rangnekar, Indicationsof GeographicalOngin in Asia: Legal
and Polip Issues to Resolve, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 273, 273 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz & Pedro

Roffe eds., 2009) (noting that geographical indications "are increasingly being seen as useful
intellectual property rights for developing countries"); Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional
Knowledge, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 97, 110 ("Mysore silk sarees ... ha[ve] had a
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eventually will reach a point where the existing system will provide them with
some attractive benefits. 210 At that point, they may begin to value the effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights as highly as their developed
counterparts. 211 After all, the successful protection of intellectual property
rights depends on the existence of effective enforcement.
Moreover, although developed and less developed countries continue to
disagree over the scope and extent of their TRIPS obligations, they do share
some important common interests in the effective enforcement of intellectual
property rights. While developed countries will certainly benefit from tougher
enforcement, less developed countries would also obtain benefits if
strengthened enforcement eventually could lead developed countries to refrain
from pushing for TRIPS-plus enforcement standards.
There remains, of course, an important but difficult question about whether
and how developed countries could convince their less developed counterparts
of their intention to refrain from such a push. After all, many less developed
countries agreed to the new TRIPS standards with the expectation that the
United States would finally stop taking unilateral actions against them.212
Unfortunately, their expectations turned out to be unfounded, 213 and the push
makeover since obtaining a geographical indication, updating [their] look with trendy new (but
interestingly, natural) colors ... and 'contemporary' designs inspired by temple architecture and
tribal jewelry."). Nevertheless, the protection of geographical indications within the TRIPS
Agreement remains limited, with many less developed countries complaining about its bias
toward developed countries. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
GLOBAL EcONOMY 239 (2000) ("[The evolving language in TRIPS on geographical indications
remains largely ... confined to wines and spirits, while many developing countries point to food
products that could be protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea.").
210 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Propery Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1
WIPO J. 1, 10-15 (2009) (discussing the existence of a crossover point where countries consider
their self-interest to move from a pirating nation to one that strongly respects intellectual
property rights).
211 As I noted earlier:
[B]ecause of the importance of enforcement in both areas, enforcement issues
may provide a promising opportunity for both developed and less-developed
countries to cooperate. Although each country group is likely to seek protection
for very different objects-developed countries for stronger intellectual
property protection and less-developed countries for stronger protection of
cultural relics-both of them are likely to be interested in building a stronger
enforcement environment that will protect their interests. Such cooperation
would enable these countries to work together, sharing with each other
experience, knowledge, and best practices about law enforcement in general.
Yu, supra note 208, at 453.
212 See David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Pmperty Rhts: The Issues in GATT, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 909 (1989) (suggesting that states might not accept new multilateral
commitments in intellectual property area if they are going to be vulnerable to unilateral actions);
Yu, supra note 13, at 372 (noting that "many less developed countries claimed that it would have
been pointless for them to join the WTO had the United States been able to continue imposing
unilateral sanctions despite their membership").
213 See Peter Drahos, Negotiating IntellectualProperty Rights: Between Coerion and Dialogue, in GLOBAL
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for TRIPS-plus standards has greatly accelerated since the mid-2000s. Less
developed countries, therefore, received not only a bad bargain, but also a failed
bargain.214 In the words of Sylvia Ostry, what many considered the "Grand
Bargain" was, in effect, a "Bum Deal!" 215
C. LESSON 3: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

If developed countries want to convince their less developed counterparts to
support the establishment of stronger international intellectual property
enforcement norms, they need to devise strategies to reconcile their differences
while emphasizing their common interests in effective enforcement of
intellectual property rights. Indeed, if resource and capacity constraints in less
developed countries constitute the main barrier to greater cooperation between
developed and less developed countries in the area of international intellectual
property enforcement, developed countries may want to look harder for
solutions that may help remove this barrier.
For example, developed countries can take seriously those TRIPS
obligations that call for the promotion of technology transfer, technical
cooperation, and legal assistance in developing and least-developed countries.
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "[d]eveloped country Members
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base." 216 Article 67, which is entitled "Technical Cooperation,"
further provides:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement,
developed country Members shall provide, on request and on
mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial
cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country
Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the
preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the
establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies
217
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 161, 172 ("The 301 process ... grew bigger,

better and stronger after TRIPS was concluded.").
214 Yu, sipra note 13, at 379.
215 Ostry, supra note 70, at 105.
216 TRIPS Agreement art. 66.
217 Id. art. 67.
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Sadly, despite the explicit language in these two provisions and the WTO's
recent affirmation of the mandatory nature of the technology transfer
obligations under Article 66.2,218 developed countries thus far have only paid lip
service to these obligations, with some undoubtedly subscribing to the view that
these obligations are merely aspirational.
Developed countries also can consider some of the many innovative
proposals commentators have advanced to address the resource and capacity
constraints encountered by less developed countries. For instance, Carsten
Fink, in a paper written before he became WIPO's first-ever Chief Economist,
called on either developed country governments or intellectual property rights
holders to bear the costs of intellectual property enforcement in less developed
countries. 219 As he explained:
Since developed country firms derive a direct benefit from
stronger IPRs enforcement, it may be in the interest of their
governments to subsidize IPRs enforcement activities in
developing countries. Thus, the question of whether stepped-up
IPRs enforcement in less developed countries should not be
financed by developed country governments is a matter for
reflection.
Another approach would be to have enforcement costs borne
directly by private rights holders. Arguably, at least some
consumers benefit from stronger enforcement action and should
therefore share the costs of the public good represented by law
enforcement activities. However, private rights holders are the
most direct beneficiary of better enforcement and they can
therefore be expected to make a substantial contribution to the
financing of underlying costs.220
Likewise, Mark Liang, in a recently-published student comment, suggested
the need to create an "IPR Enforcement Fund" that draws on the WTO's
annual membership dues. 221 According to him:

218 Paragraph 11.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001, which covers
implementation-related issues and concerns, states: "[T]he provisions of Article 66.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement are mandatory." World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns: Decision of 14 November 2001, T 11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 20, 2001). The decision
further required the TRIPS Council to "put in place a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring
and full implementation of the obligations in question." Id.
219 Fink, supra note 32, at 19.
220 Id. at 17.
221 Mark Lang, Comment, A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can Use WTO
Disclosure Requirements to Curb IntellectualProperty Infringement in China, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 285, 300-02
(2010).
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The WTO could require member states to pay into an "IPR
enforcement fund" through annual membership fees. The fund's
proceeds would then be distributed to China and other member
states that have poor IPR enforcement records. The distribution
of funds would be conditioned on their use for IPR enforcement
purposes. For example, the money could be used for increasing
seizure and confiscation efforts, hiring and training judicial and
administrative agency personnel to handle IPR cases, and
222
defraying the costs of judicial and administrative proceedings.
Liang's proposal builds on not only the technical and financial assistance
obligations in the WTO and under the TRIPS Agreement, but also the
223
GATT/WTO's longstanding practice of providing such assistance.
D. LESSON 4: LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

If less developed countries want international intellectual property
enforcement norms to be shaped in a way that takes their interests into account
and that shows a greater appreciation of their significantly different socio224
Until recently, less
economic conditions, they need to be more proactive.
developed countries have been rather passive. As Part IV.B has shown, most of
the efforts by less developed countries in the TRIPS Council and the WTO
dispute settlement process have remained on the defensive end. Although
these initial efforts succeeded in resisting the adoption of new TRIPS-plus
enforcement standards in the WTO, developed countries remain in the driver's
seat of the international intellectual property enforcement debate.
The limited involvement of less developed countries in this debate, however,
has changed recently. The complaints India and Brazil filed against the
European Union and the Netherlands in May 2010 and the interventions China
and India made in the TRIPS Council meeting a month later have opened up
many new possibilities for less developed countries to shape international
intellectual property enforcement norms. 225 As Professor Sell reminded us:
"Each new round of contestation and settlement produces new winners and
losers. History has shown that depending on how well mobilized and badly
226
If the
threatened the losers are, they can rise up to challenge the settlement."
TRIPS Agreement is, indeed, a work in progress, these countries will have their

Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 301-02.
224 Xue Hong made a similar point. See Xue, supra note 36, at 145 ("The developing countries,
despite their tremendous diversity, must set up a united front, develop a series of practical
strategies and proactively initiate a pro-development enforcement agenda.").
225 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 169-200.
226 Sell, supra note 203, at 321.
222
223
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opportunities. Whether they can succeed, however, will depend on whether
they can rise up to the challenge of pushing for the adoption of their preferred
norms.
To help get these norms accepted, they need to think harder about not only
their strategies, but also about whether and how to redefine the concept of
intellectual property enforcement. 227 To redefine this concept, they may want
to explore whether enforcement should be reconceptualized by taking both
rights and responsibilities into account-for example, by focusing on the abuse
of rights or restraints on trade in addition to the protection of rights holders.
Such a reconceptualization would be consistent with the positions long held by
less developed countries, most notably Brazil and India.228 The proposed
reconceptualization would also be strongly supported by the text of the TRIPS
Agreement, which already includes many provisions targeting the abuse of
rights or process and restraints on trade or competition. 229
In addition, less developed countries can explore what type of enforcement
standards will be cost-effective and socially optimal under local conditions. 230
They can further seek standards that are appropriate for stimulating creativity
and innovation in countries with limited resources and a small market. They
can even take into account the many innovative ways that now exist to spur
creativity and innovation (including those that are not enshrined in the TRIPS
Agreement or other international treaties, or those that rights holders in the
developed world have ignored or rejected). As Carolyn Deere pointed out, "the
debate on IP policy reform ought not to rely solely on assessments of the past,
but also on scenarios for the future." 231
In its final report, the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
reminded us that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
is "a means to an end, not an end in itself." 232 This reminder is important
because such protection and enforcement should not be based on a mere leap
227See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPOJ. 1, 17 (2010).
228As Brazil declared in a submission to the TRIPS Negotiating Group:
IWlhen one speaks of "rights" of intellectual property owners, one is
automatically bound to deal with the subject of "obligations" of these owners.
The objective of such obligations which deserves priority attention is to allow
greater access to technological innovation for IPR users. If the whole attention
of the discussions is centered on the interests of IPR owners, the balance of the
entire IPR system is not taken into account.
Submissionfrom Bragil,supra note 194, 11 16-17.
229See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 1; id. arts. 8.2, 40.1, 40.2, 41.1, 48.1, 50.3, 53, 63.1,
67.
230 See Li Xuan, WCO SECURE: Legal and Economic Assessments of the TRIPS-plus-plus IP
Enforcement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 18, at 62, 74-75
(underscoring the importance of developing a socially optimal intellectual property enforcement
regime).
231 DEERE, supra note 40, at 323.
232 IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 40, at 6.
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of faith. After all, an intellectual property system should be "viewed as forming
part of a broader set of measures designed to optimize knowledge development
and utilization .. . [which, in turn,] enhance economic growth, cultural
prosperity, and human development." 233
Finally, if less developed countries want to drive the discussions on
international intellectual property enforcement norms, they need to learn to
frame the public debate better.234 As Amy Kapczynski reminded us:
Frames affect what the players understand to be their interests,
whom they believe to be their allies, and how they justify the
change they seek. These frames direct as well as reflect material
circumstances, and as a result, the domain of the political cannot
235
be mathematically reduced to the domain of the material.
For example, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos pointed out insightfully,
"[h]ad TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the anxiety of mass publics
in the US and other Western states might have become a factor in destabilizing
the consensus that US business elites had built around TRIPS." 236 Likewise,
Susan Sell favored "grants talk" over "rights talk."237 As she explained, from
the standpoint of international development, grants talk "highlights the fact that
what may be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with other

233 Daniel

J.

Gervais,

TRIPS and Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 3, 4; see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Properly and the Information
Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 15 (stating that intellectual property laws and policies
"constitute only one of the many components of the information ecosystem").
234 See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 40, at 172-73; John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Reframing the Issue:
The If/TO Coalition on Intellectual Propery and Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE, supra
note 172, at 85-87; Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobiligation and the New Politics of
Intellectual Propery, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 809 (2008); Yu, supra note 54, at 552.
235 Kapczynski, supra note 234, at 809. Likewise, Carolyn Deere observed:
Frames were ... used by a range of stakeholders to influence, distort, and alter
communications to their advantage with the hope of setting and dominating the
terms of debate and determining what stakeholders should be arguing about.
Framing was used to fix meanings, build shared understandings, and influence
how challenges were defined and represented. This in turn served to legitimate
and motivate particular kinds of collective action and impact what kinds of
solutions were adopted in particular policy debates.
DEERE, supra note 40, at 169; see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 528 (2000) ("Rhetoric, 'the art of persuasive communication', has a place in
international negotiations and lobbying affecting business regulation." (citation omitted)); Yu,
supra note 13, at 389 ("Like interpretation, how one frames the intellectual property debate is
equally important, because such framing might affect the receptiveness of the WTO member
states to the demands, or perhaps pleas, of the less developed world.").
236 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHos, supra note 235, at 576.
237 SELL, supra note 14, at 146.
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important goals" and is likely to discourage policymakers from focusing on the
entitlement of the rights holders. 238
Like public health issues and grants talk, the international enforcement
debate can be better framed. The fact that less developed countries prefer
weaker intellectual property enforcement and stronger protection against the
abuse of rights and restraints on trade does not mean that these countries favor
piracy and counterfeiting. Whether they can get their points across and earn
support in the public debate, however, will depend on whether they can
properly frame the debate to articulate positions that developed countries may
find counterintuitive.239 Such framing and articulation are particularly important
in light of the fact that the intellectual property enforcement debate has been
highly polarized and often clouded by misconceptions and unverifiable data. 240
V.

CONCLUSION

Although developed countries and their supportive intellectual property
industries had high hopes that the Agreement would provide effective
enforcement of intellectual property rights shortly after the inception of the
TRIPS Agreement, the Agreement has yet to fulfill these expectations. Thus,
from the standpoint of developed countries and selected sectors in middleincome countries, the TRIPS enforcement provisions can be largely considered
as the Agreement's Achilles' heel. From the standpoint of others, however, the
existence of weak TRIPS enforcement provisions may very well be a blessing in
disguise.
Thus, if the global intellectual property enforcement regime is to become
more balanced, robust, and sustainable, countries need to be more appreciative
of the positions taken by their trading partners-whether developed or less
developed. They also need to pay greater attention to the many challenges that
confronted the TRIPS delegates two decades ago. Until developed and less
developed countries can work together to achieve a global consensus on
international intellectual property enforcement norms, the battle over these
norms will continue, and the uproar caused by the developed countries' push
for ACTA and other TRIPS-plus bilateral and plurilateral standards is only the
beginning.
Fortunately, fifteen years is a very short time in the age of international law
development. For reference purposes, the international human rights system,
though young, has already celebrated its sixtieth anniversary. 241 With more than

238

Id

239 See generaly Yu, supra note 54, at 568-73 (discussing the importance of rhetoric in the

international intellectual property debate).
240 See generaly Li, supra note 33 (discussing these misconceptions and unreliable data).
241 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
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a decade of interpretation and implementation, the TRIPS Agreement,
therefore, can only be described as an immature teenager, with much room to
grow and prosper. Because the enforcement provisions constitute an integral
part of the TRIPS Agreement, they will grow alongside the Agreement.
Whether they can prosper, however, will depend on whether they are given the
right conditions and nourishment.

U.N.T.S. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 111(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,

at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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